Financial liberalization and financial instability in the selected SADC member countries by Cele, Nolungelo Mercy
  
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN THE 
SELECTED SADC MEMBER COUNTRIES 
By 
NOLUNGELO MERCY CELE 
(201201172) 
 
A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
Masters of Commerce Degree 
In 
Economics  
 
University of Fort Hare 
East London 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr F.M Kapingura 
January 2018 
 
 
 
II 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The study examined the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability in selected 
SADC member countries namely South Africa, Tanzania, Madagascar and Botswana for the 
period 1970-2012. The Panel data methodology was adopted to establish the relationship 
between the two variables. Impaired loans were used to capture financial instability and 
financial reforms to capture the level of financial liberalization. Credit to the private sector, 
government expenditure, GDP and inflation were utilised as control variables The empirical 
findings reveal that financial liberalization leads to financial instability. The financial reforms 
were found to be positively related with the impaired loans ratio in almost all the specifications. 
It was also found that financial instability intensifies when the global financial crisis is taken 
into consideration. This suggests that financial liberalization can therefore be another source 
of financial instability in the SADC countries. The empirical results imply that policy makers 
should focus on reforms that give due share to the regulations rather than just simply 
liberalizing the financial sector.  
Key words: Financial liberalization, financial instability, Southern African Development 
Community. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
In the past thirty years several developing countries around the world, especially in Africa 
liberalized their financial systems aiming to increase the scope of its role of mobilising and 
allocating financial resources (Enowbi and Mlambo, 2012). According to Patnaik (2011) 
financial liberalization was introduced in developing countries in the 1980’s. Its aim was to 
give financial markets a greater role in the development of countries and not just rely on the 
state. Patnaik (2011) further noted that bringing in financial liberalization was also a response 
to a number of issues relating to finance. These include costs, corruption, and inefficiencies 
associated with using finance as an instrument of populist; state-led development; a need for 
more financial resources; citizens’ demands for better finance and lower concealed taxes and 
subsidies; and the pressures employed on suppressed financial systems by greater international 
trade, travel, migration, and better communications.  
 
This study aims to examine the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability in 
selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) region member countries. 
According to Bezemer, Bumann and Lensink (2015), financial instability refers to businesses’ 
failure to repay bank loans. Empirical literature accounts both negative and positive impacts of 
financial liberalization on financial instability. The SADC signifies a regional economic 
community allied with 15 countries. Southern Africa is targeting to attain development and 
economic growth by reducing poverty, by using proficiently natural resources and intensifying 
the quality and standard of people’s lives in the region by inter-dependence of member 
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countries, encouraging and maintaining peace and security through effective protection of the 
region, and strengthening cultural, historical and social links among them (Manzombi, 2012).  
 
Studies have been documented to support liberalization of the financial system such as the 
well-known McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) viewed 
financial liberalization as establishing higher interest rates that balance the demand for, and the 
supply of savings. Higher interest rates eventually lead to increased savings and financial 
intermediation as well as the enhancement of the efficiency of using savings. Higher real 
interest rates would increase the extent of financial intermediation while increased financial 
intermediation raises the rate of economic growth in developing countries. This is further 
supported by Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012).  
 
However, even though financial liberalization succeeded in easing financial repression, 
Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012) highlight that its impact on growth and investment has 
not been convincing. At the same time, there are studies by Demirguc- Kunt and Levine (2008) 
and Enowbi and Mlambo (2012) which highlight that financial sector liberalization may 
actually create financial sector instability and crisis. Financial crisis could manifest itself in the 
form of bank failures, intense asset price volatility or a collapse in market liquidity. This has 
the potential of disrupting the payment and settlement process with dire effects as it can be 
transmitted to the real sector through its linkages with the financial sector. This is also 
supported by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Lorenzo (2008).  
 
The study examines selected SADC countries as poverty remains one of the greatest challenges 
in the region. As one of the ways to eradicate the high levels of poverty, the countries in the 
region have considered one of their main objectives to be achieving sustainable economic 
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growth and development. The studies of Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012) support that 
this can be achieved through capital account liberalization which will attract more investment 
as well as mobilise savings which ultimately promote investment. It is therefore important to 
determine to what extent financial liberalization causes financial instability.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the SADC countries just like any of the African countries, financial liberalization was 
implemented through allowing market-determined interest rates. This was expected to bring 
with it a number of benefits to a country (Ikhide, 2015). These would include higher real deposit 
rates, thus stimulating savings. This would result in an efficient allocation of loanable funds. 
The other benefit expected from liberalization was the elimination of distortions which arise 
from a variety of administrative controls. Patnaik (2011) show that high interest rates were 
expected to promote financial deepening, help in the expansion of domestic capital formation 
and hence stimulate economic growth.  
 
Though much was expected from financial liberalization, Ikhide and Alawode (2002) 
documents a number of problems to which many of the African countries which adopted 
liberalization at the time. These challenges include sharp increases in interest rates, 
bankruptcies of financial institutions and high levels of inflation. Liberalization also resulted 
in increased capital inflows which allowed rapid growth in credit to public and private 
institutions which were regarded as weak at the time. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) also 
highlights that the quality of lending in general deteriorated in many of the countries which 
implemented liberalization. 
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The impact of financial liberalization on financial fragility has been brought to the fore 
following the 2008 Global financial crisis which emanated from the US. The recent studies 
which have examined the extent to which liberalization can result in financial fragility include 
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006), Lorenzoni (2008), Magud, et al. (2012), Calderón and 
Kubota (2012), Bezemer, et al.  (2015). These show that during of the global financial crisis, 
financial liberalization intensified competition which then resulted in a decline in the franchise 
value of banks and the only way banks responded to this was by accepting more risk exposure 
so as to maintain their profits. This in turn, had dire consequences for the entire financial system 
and hence the whole economy.  
 
This becomes important in the case of the SADC countries given that the SADC 2012 report 
on financial sector points out that through the development of the protocol on trade, the region 
is implementing plans which are aimed at increasing economic liberalization within Southern 
Africa. The protocol is in line with the SADC vision of a regional integration which is 
supported by member states as it is viewed as another way through which the region may have 
a strong economy as well as increasing international investment. Although much has been put 
forward to support financial sector liberalization, it becomes important to also examine if it can 
be another source of financial sector instability in the region given the mixed results in the 
academic discourse.  
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of the study was to examine the effect of financial liberalization on the 
financial instability. The specific objectives were: 
1.3.1 To provide an overview of liberalization policies instituted by selected countries in 
the SADC region.  
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1.3.2 Empirically assess the extent to which liberalization of the financial system impact on 
financial instability.  
1.3.3 Based on empirical results, articulate policy implications of the study. 
 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS  
1.4.1 Liberalization of the financial system does have an impact on financial instability of a 
country.  
1.4.2 Liberalization of the financial system does not have an impact on financial instability of 
a country. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
In the case of SADC, it is interesting to note that the available studies by Loayza and Ranciera 
(2002), Guillaumont and Kpodar (2004), Sibanda (2012) and Khumalo and Kapingura, (2013) 
analysed the impact of financial liberalization and have largely concentrated on economic. . On 
the other hand the study of Murinde (2010) focused on analysing its impact on trade in the 
region. There are a few studies which have focused on analysing how liberalization can be 
another source of financial instability. As a result, the study makes a contribution in the 
literature by examining the relationship between financial liberalization and financial 
instability in the region given its goals of pursuing the goal of financial liberalization aiming 
to increase the level of investment and achieve higher levels of economic growth. 
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The study was organised as follows: Introduction and background to the study in Chapter one; 
Chapter two which looked at the trends in financial liberalization in the SADC countries. 
Chapter three focused on the literature review of the study which embodied the theoretical 
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portion and empirical evidence of the study. The research methodology, which is inclusive of 
the research design, data sources, model formulation, and estimation techniques, was dealt with 
in Chapter four. Chapter five presents the findings of the study while Chapter six provides a 
summary of the main findings of the study, conclusion and policy implications of the study.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE SELECTED SADC 
COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The financial sector has a critical role in modern market economies as it provides basic payment 
and transaction services, intermediating society’s savings to its best uses, offering households, 
enterprises and governments risk management tools. However of late it has been seen as 
another source of fragility as was witnessed during the 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis (Rancière, Tornell and Westermann, 2006).  
 
Since the predominant acceptance of the idea of financial liberalisation, many countries have 
made attempts to liberalise their financial sectors by deregulating interest rates, eliminating or 
reducing credit controls, allowing free entry into the banking sector, giving autonomy to 
commercial banks, permitting private ownership of banks, and liberalising international capital 
flows (Rancière, et al. 2006). However, of these six dimensions of financial liberalisation, 
interest rate liberalisation has received the main focus of attention. Unfortunately, the countries 
that embarked on interest rate liberalisation have had mixed experiences. Whether financial 
liberalisation is a cause of financial instability still remains a question for empirical 
investigation.  
 
In aiming to achieve the main objective of the study this chapter will discuss the overview of 
financial liberalisation for the selected SADC countries namely South Africa, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. The chapter is divided into six subsections: Following the 
introduction, Section 2.2 presents a general overview of the financial liberalization in the 
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SADC region Section 2.3 presents an overview of the financial system of the SADC region 2.4 
provides an overview of financial liberalization in South Africa, 2.5 provides an overview of 
financial liberalization in Mozambique, 2.6 provides an overview of financial liberalisation 
Tanzania, 2.7 provides an overview of financial liberalisation in Madagascar and 2.8 provides 
a conclusion to the chapter. 
  
2.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN THE SADC 
REGION 
The main objective of implementing liberalisation of trade in financial services was that open 
markets function in a more efficient way, deliver improved pricing and provide improved 
access (Manzombi, 2012). It is possible that foreign banks may be more efficient than domestic 
banks as they have access to a larger, more diverse group of capital (Ikhide, 2015). Foreign 
banks can as well benefit from economies of scale. This is mainly relevant when operating in 
small economies, with inadequate sources of capital, such as the economies of a number of 
SADC countries.  
 
When measuring the level of trade liberalisation in the financial services sector in SADC, the 
starting point is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). All the SADC countries 
are members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their commitments under the GATS 
shows whether or not a country is willing to open up or negotiate in a specific services sector 
(UNCTAD, 2010). 
 
Most of the SADC countries adopted banking sector reforms in the 1990s as part of the 
economic structural adjustment programmes that were encouraged by the International 
Monetary Fund together with the World Bank. These reforms involved the re-construction of 
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the balance sheets of banks to reduce bad debts, the privatisation of state-owned banks, as well 
as allowing foreign participants into the domestic banking market. Most of the reforms were 
not devoted under the GATS, for instance Botswana, has not made any commitments in the 
financial sector under GATS whereas it has eliminated all forms of exchange control. 
According to UNCTAD, (2010), the failure to commit to reforms under GATS reflects the 
SADC countries’ exhaustion towards GATS negotiations and their fear of making binding 
commitments with no knowledge as to whether or not the reforms will actually work.  
 
Mpofu (2013) highlight that in 2004, the financial sectors of Mauritius, Seychelles and South 
Africa developed significantly, with 50% of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP) being 
invested in highly accessible, short-term securities and deposits. The author does also point out 
that Tanzania has also fared well. Prior to liberalisation, no foreign banks operated in the 
country; five such institutions were operating by 1998 (Mpofu, 2013).  However, the countries 
have witnessed an enormous change in the financial sector.  In 2006, SADC established the 
Protocol on Finance and Investment, which sets out policies for financial development in the 
region. It recommends member states to cooperate on a number of aspects of financial systems 
as the region builds toward a market-driven system. These aspects include integrated regional 
economy: banking supervision; Payment systems; Exchange control policies; and Stock 
exchanges (UNCTAD, 2010).   
 
SADC member countries are also involved in a number of regional agreements that are likely 
to impact on the banking sector. Despite slow progress in ratifying the SADC Protocol on Trade 
in Services, negotiations are expected to begin in 2012 and the financial sector has been 
identified as one of 6 priority sectors for early negotiation. In addition, the SADC Finance and 
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Investment Protocol (FIP), which came into force in 2010, commits SADC members to 
cooperate across a broad range of financial matters (UNCTAD, 2010).  
 
 In 2010, negotiations on services trade liberalization took place under the support of the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the EU. Since some SADC member states were 
also members of other regional groups, such as the Common Market for Eastern and South 
Africa (COMESA), they were spread over different negotiating formations. In all of the 
agreements, the banking sector was likely to be a key offensive interest of the EU (UNCTAD, 
2010).  
 
 SADC has also established a fifteen year Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP), which outlines priorities for the region in all major sectors. This plan shows that, as 
SADC includes more members into its customs union, it will be crucial to deepen monetary 
and trade cooperation’s throughout the region. According to Lorenzoni (2008) this level of 
mutual aid and trade occurs most effectively in a financial climate without restrictions on 
investment and lending. Alternatively, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
supports local entrepreneurs in developing businesses and a climate that attracts foreign capital.  
 
Mpofu (2013) indicated that these liberalized policies have generated a positive effect on 
economic growth in the SADC region. Interest rates have risen following liberalization, which 
has encouraged saving. Most recently, Malawi, Angola and Madagascar have all made 
improvements to their credit systems, which should free access to credit for local investors in 
the future.  
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Nonetheless, increased financial liberalization has not addressed all of the region’s economic 
problems. Inflation continues to stride with the interest rates in most member states, and 
changes in economic development among nations have widened. Additionally, many member 
states are not deeply integrated into the global economy and observe even less international 
trade and investment during the initial stages of reform. However, many contributing factors 
other than financial policy, lack of infrastructure, labour issues, and regional conflicts have all 
impacted the economic development of the SADC region (Lorenzoni, 2008). According to 
Ikhide (2015), as improved industrial productivity and foreign trade strengthen member 
countries, links to the global economy, the liberalized financial policies of SADC are expected 
to attract even further investment into the SADC region and build upon gains already made 
towards regional and national economic growth.  
 
2.2.1 Exchange controls 
Exchange control involves the state dictating the value of its currency traded or exchanged with 
foreign currency. Exchange controls are embodied by current and capital accounts. Liberalizing 
exchange controls was meant to eradicate the governmental burden related to managing 
exchange controls, whereas the liberalization of the capital account was aimed at growing 
capital flows (Ikhide, 2015).  
 
All SADC member countries have made remarkable progress in liberalization of exchange 
control on current accounts. Towards the end of 2010, major current account liberalization 
occurred in Mozambique and there was also substantial reduction in controls and floating of 
the Kwacha occurred in Malawi. Zimbabwe and Mozambique made substantial initiative and 
Malawi floated its currency in May 2012. There have also been developments in the 
liberalization of the capital account; however, service restriction is still very high in member 
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countries such as Angola and Malawi that are not fully liberalized (Mpofu, 2013).  Table 1 
depicts exchange controls development in the SADC region showing the index for each 
member state. It can be viewed that the restriction index is high in non-fully liberalized member 
states, for instance Angola as compared to Botswana which is liberalized. 
 
Table 2.1: Exchange Control Developments in the SADC region in 2012. 
Country 
Exchange Control 
Restriction Index-
2012 Current Account Capital Account 
Angola 57.1 Restricted Restricted 
Botswana 18.1 Liberalised Liberalised 
DRC 35.7 Liberalised Restricted 
Lesotho 42.2 Liberalised Restricted 
Madagascar 32.3 Liberalised Restricted 
Malawi 44.9 Restricted Restricted 
Mauritius 17.0 Liberalised Liberalised 
Mozambique 39.3 Liberalised Restricted 
Namibia 44.7 Partially Liberalised Restricted 
Seychelles 8.4 Liberalised Liberalised 
South Africa 38.9 Liberalised Restricted 
Swaziland 47.3 Restricted Restricted 
Tanzania 35.7 Liberalised Restricted 
Zambia 10.5 Liberalised Liberalised 
Zimbabwe 28.1 Liberalised Restricted 
Source:  Mpofu (2013)     
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2.3 AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE SADC REGION 
Though financial liberalization has been implemented in the SADC countries as discussed in 
the preceding section, Manzombi (2012) highlighted that when compared to other relative 
regions, member countries of the SADC prove to have slow growth when it comes to financial 
sector development. It is worth mentioning that member countries of the SADC region vary in 
terms of the banking and economic structures. To show this heterogeneity, this section 
discussed the performance in some relevant indicators for the SADC economies.  
 
According to Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012), the reason for a very slow 
financial sector development in SADC countries is the high cost of activities carried out by 
banks in the member countries. This then leads to high levels of interest rate spreads.  The 
graph in Figure 2.1 illustrates these high interest rate spreads which almost reach 50%. It is 
interesting to note that from 2006 to 2009 the Asian and global financial crisis were higher than 
the years 2010 to 2013. In 2013 it is only Malawi and Madagascar that showed high interest 
rate spreads.   
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 Figure 2.1: Interest Rate Spreads 
 
  Source: Banco Nacianal de Angola, (2013)  
It is important to look at credit to the private sector/GDP ratio as a macroeconomic indicator 
when looking at financial sector development. This indicator the serves as the best tool when 
forecasting a banking crisis. However, the indicator’s significance for the economies is subject 
to regulatory framework and development stage for each banking system. In Figure 2.2, the 
change in credit/GDP indicates that it is better to accrue capital during a period where a 
systematic risk is anticipated.  For the duration of the pre-crisis period of 2006-2009. South 
Africa and Mauritius show very high average of credit/GDP ratio.  
 
According to Cihak, et al. (2012) during the pre-crisis period South Africa exceeded the upper 
threshold recommended by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). BIS document studies 
that contributes to analytical frameworks, amongst these studies in 2010 BIS suggest the 
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requirement of capital in the form of shock absorbers, which should be placed in a buffer of 0 
to 2, 5 per cent above the minimum set by the regulation. The average for the SADC region is 
significantly low. 
 
   Figure 2.2: Credit to the Private Sector (per cent of GDP) Spreads. 
 
 Source: Banco Nacianal de Angola (2013) 
After looking at credit to private sector, Figure 3 below shows the performance of credit to 
central government. The averages of credit to private sector and central government are 
different. In most countries, the spreads are touching zero and some are negative. Botswana 
has shown average values of -36.9 per cent of the credit to private sector as a percentage of 
GDP for 2006 to2009 and -19, and 5 per cent 2010 to 2013. These results led to the SADC 
region collectively displaying a fair position, which is in line with the average values of – 0.3 
per cent of GDP for 2006 to 2009 and 1.4 per cent of GDP for 2010 to 2013. Cihak, et al. 
(2012) concluded that a negative net credit to central government suggests that deposits by 
government in the banking system are greater than the lending by banks to government.  
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  Figure 2.3: Credit to the Central Government. 
  
Source: Banco Nacianal de Angola (2013) 
 
Lastly another indicator is financial deepening and it is measured by M2 as a percentage of 
GDP. It is best to measure financial deepening by using the percentage of GDP as M2 growth 
is likely to decline after a banking crisis. The performance of M2 is illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
For this indicator, South Africa and Mauritius have performed amazingly well throughout the 
reviewed periods having an average of 91 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively in the pre-
crisis period. The average for the SADC region jointly is almost reaching 50 per cent. Banco 
Nacianal de Angola (2013) submits that implementing reforms associated with these averages 
implied a steady increase in the deepening measures financial systems. 
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   Figure 2.4: M2 as a percentage of GDP Measuring Financial Deepening. 
 
 Source: Banco Nacianal de Angola (2013) 
 
The above figure shows that the SADC member countries have varied performances, reflective 
of the distinctive characteristics relating to the nature and stage of development of each country. 
The following sections will look at the overview of financial liberalization of selected SADC 
countries individually.  
 
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Financial liberalization in South Africa was started just after the De Kock Commission Reports 
which were between the years 1978 and 1985. Interest and credit controls were removed in 
1980, whereas liquidity ratios of banks were reduced extensively between 1983 and 1985. 
Credit ceilings were initiated in the 1960s and 1970s. The South African Reserve Bank imposed 
an upper limit on the aggregate of loans so that banks were allowed to extend in 1967. In 1968 
credit ceilings were furthermore stretched to cover bank investment in the private sector 
securities (Sibanda, 2012).  
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In trying to control competition, credit ceilings were even spread to non-monetary banks in 
1970. Even though credit ceilings became unrestricted in 1972, the bank credit ceilings to the 
private sector were reemployed in 1976.  Credit ceilings were further made stringent between 
1977 and 1979, however the credit ceilings were ended in 1980. According to Williamson and 
Mohar (1998), the Register of Cooperation, which limited bank competition was also removed 
in 1983. In the 1970s and 1980s the predominant political environment caused an ongoing 
imposition of sanctions on South Africa which led the country to being deprived of access to 
the international financial markets. Hence, South Africa was characterised by interest and 
exchange rate controls, credit ceilings and directed credit allocation, cash and liquid 
requirements. Nonetheless, South Africa started the reform process, particularly after 1994, to 
enforce freedom in the financial sector.  
 
2.4.1 South Africa Pre- Financial Liberalisation 
Prior to liberalization which was between 1960 and 1980 South Africa was characterized by 
strong dependence on administrative controls such as ceilings on extending deposit rate and 
bank credit to curb growth in liquidity and aggregate spending (Gidlow, 1995). Also from the 
beginning of 1961 South Africa was characterised by extreme exchange controls which were 
meant to provide some protection to the national economy from the negative effects of capital 
flights (Gidlow, 1995). The capital account limitations limited cross-border flows of capital 
and lessened foreign competition and removed access to foreign instruments. Indirect credit 
controls in the form of credit ceilings were enforced through moral suasion. Credit ceilings 
were imposed in the 1960s and 1970. The South African Reserve Bank imposed an upper limit 
on the aggregate of loans so that banks were allowed to extend in 1967 (Odhiambo, 2011).  
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In 1965 the authorities instituted another restriction with regards to assets that can be instantly 
converted into cash or else be utilized as cash. This restriction is also known as the liquid asset 
requirement. This was followed by the deposit rate control in 1965 and the high bank reserve 
requirements in 1965 to 1966. The deposit rate controls were imposed to make sure that home 
mortgage rates were not increased parallel to interest rates increases and also reduce 
competition between banks and building societies (Sibanda, 2012).  
 
Interest rates in South Africa were greatly controlled before liberalization. The South African 
Reserve Bank was in authority of outlining maximum and minimum deposit and lending rates. 
In the years 1967 and 1975, the minimum deposit rate and prime overdraft lending rates were 
fixed at 2% and 2.5%, accordingly, above the bank rate. As of 1975, banks were allowed to set 
their lowest overdraft rates within the margins of 2.5 - 3.5% above the bank rate. This continued 
until 1980 when interest rate controls were dropped. The deposit rate, on the other hand, had 
its first upper limits imposed in 1965. Although this restriction was dropped in 1970, it was re-
introduced in 1972. It was maintained until 1980, when the deposit rates were fully liberalised. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the trends of interest rates, and the inflation rate, in South Africa during 
the period 1960-1979 (Odhiambo, 2011).  
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  Figure 2.5: Trends of Interest Rates and Inflation Rate in South Africa (1969-1979). 
 
Source: Odhiambo (2011)  
2.4.2   South Africa Post-Financial Liberalization 
In South Africa the efforts of financial sector liberalization were started in 1980. South Africa 
liberalised both its lending and deposit rates in 1980. The foundation for this quick interest rate 
liberalisation was to allow banks greater flexibility and to encourage competition. After the 
liberalisation of interest rates, banks were able to vary rates charged to borrowers according to 
their cost of funds and according to creditworthiness of different borrowers. Even though the 
monetary authorities expected interest rates to be positive in real terms after their deregulation, 
interest rates generally remained negative in real terms. It was not until the 1990s that a distinct 
positive interest rate was attained. After 1990, the rates remained fairly and consistently 
positive over and above inflation, except in 1992, when rates fell drastically (Odhiambo, 2011). 
High interest rates became necessary in order to attain the twin objectives of curbing inflation 
and maintaining a current account surplus. 
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Following the liberalisation of interest rates in 1980, nominal interest rates increased 
significantly, although real interest rates remained negative until the mid-1980s. The nominal 
deposit rate, for example, increased immediately after the adoption of financial liberalisation 
from 5.54% in 1980 to 18.29% in 1984 before declining during 1984 to 1987. During 1988 to 
1990, the nominal deposit rate increased again, however, this high deposit rate did not last for 
long. During 1991 to 1994 the interest rates showed another declining trend. The figure below 
figure 2.6 expresses although the real prime and repo interest rates increased during 1995 to 
1998, they later declined in 2000. By 2001, the real prime and repo rate displayed a number of 
decreasing of values. In 2004 an increase Interest rate increased, but another declining trend is 
seen till 2012. In 2008 which is the year of the financial crisis the repo rate went to a negative. 
 
 Figure 2.6: Interest rate Trends after Financial Liberalization. 
 
 Source : Sibanda (2012). 
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The reserve and liquidity requirements were reduced in 1980 and were further reduced more 
throughout the 1980s. This shaped South Africa’s financial system to a fairly competitive 
setting for the financial institutions that were subject to these requirements i.e commercial 
banks and those that were not subject to these requirementr. In the 1990s, the minimum reserve 
requirements to be held by banks in South Africa were altered from a fixed proportion of the 
value of short-term liabilities to a fixed proportion of the value of total liabilities (Nel, 2000). 
In 1998, the Reserve Bank then introduced a mutual reserve ratio of 2.5% on the total liabilities 
of banks, excluding issued capital and reserves.  
 
Bank credit is an important source of finance to the private sector in South Africa. The credit 
controls removed in 1980. Ever since the credit controls were removed there has been a 
substantial growth in the private credit . Over the past 30 years bank lending to the private 
sector increased at a relatively high average annual rate of 17.9%. It has been on the steady 
increase from 56% of GDP in 1980 to 162% of GDP in 2007 (Sibanda, 2012). There was 
however a drop from 2008 which waspartially resulted by the 2008 global financial crisis.  
A number of foreign firms have entered the banking, insurance and broking markets since 
South Africa rejoined the world community in 1994.Between 1995 and 2000, there was 
improved bank market entry with foreign banks being permitted to open branches in South 
Africa in 1995.   
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Table 2.2: A summary the financial liberalization evolution in South Africa. 
 
Credit 
control  
   
 
Interest rates Entry barriers Exchange 
control 
Reserve 
requirements 
1965- Credit 
ceilings 
effected,  
1980- Credit 
controls were 
removed . 
1980- Interest 
rate controls 
were 
romoved, 
1998- 
Replacement 
of bank rate 
with a more 
market 
related repo 
rate. 
1995-  foreign banks 
were allowed to open 
branches in South Africa 
1983 to 1990- 50 new 
banks, 
1990- development of 
new markets and further 
development of market 
for financial derivatives; 
introduction/development 
of new financial 
instruments, 
1990- continuous 
deregulation of the 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. 
1985- 
Capital 
controls 
tightened, 
1995- 
exchange 
controls on 
non-
residents 
eliminated, 
1997- 
Controls 
on 
residents 
relaxed. 
1980- Cash 
and liquidity 
requirements 
lowered. 
Source: Sibanda (2012) 
 
To-date South Africa has a one of the strongest and most attractive financial system. The 
country has gone through structural reform in aiming increase the country’s economic growth 
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(Ikhide, 2015). It is evidence that before the liberalisation, South Africa was a distinctively 
financially repressed country having interest rate controls, direct controls, exchange controls 
and other forms of financial repression. A number of these controls have been brought forward 
as the country goes further towards full financial liberalisation. 
 
2.5 AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE 
2.5.1 Trade Agreements and reforms  
Mozambique having become a member of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
witnessed a change in its banking sector as it became fully committed to Modes 1 and 2 of the 
four modes of services Trade under GATS. Under these Modes there are no restrictions with 
regards to accessing the local market and national treatment. Mode 3 has regular limitations 
that allow international banks and financial institutions to operate in a country as long as the 
country follows the laws that dictate the local business etiquette. As for Mode 4 foreign 
financial professionals are required to have a work permit to practise within the country. Thus, 
the local financial sector in Mozambique is open to foreign financial institutions if the 
representatives hold valid work permits and the institutions follow the local laws and 
regulations (Moza Banco SA, 2012).     
2.5.2 Openness of the Mozambique Financial sector  
 
Mozambican law has a few limitations and restrictions which has resulted in heavy investments 
of foreign institutions in the country. This is indicated by the 85% dominance of financial assets 
that these foreign financial institutions control (Moza Banco SA, 2012). The presence of 
smaller local financial institutions that also thrive in this favourable environment provide for 
more options with regards to banking and investing.  
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2.5.3 The Existing Restrictions   
Mozambique has a relatively free policy with regards to exchange and trade of foreign 
currencies across its borders. However, if the amounts are to surpass the figure set out by the 
central bank it requires that the transaction are reported. There are a handful of foreign banks 
which control a huge bulk i.e. 4/5th of the banking assets. The foreign banks are not forced to 
merge with local financial institutions (IMF, 2009).  
 
The movement of natural persons, the Law on Immigration (Law No. 5/93 of 28 December 
1993) allows for foreign nationals applying their trade in the country similar rights as locals. 
They are also held accountable by law if they are found guilty of doing any illegal activities. 
The foreign professionals must however be in possession of a valid work visa. However, for 
you to get the permit you must prove that you will be able to sustain yourself and not involve 
in any criminal activities. Thus, there are no restrictions with regards to national treatment 
commitment (IMF, 2009).   
 
The central bank of Mozambique oversees the authorisation of foreign financial institutions 
seeking to run in the country. Foreign banks are also subject to constant monitoring and 
supervision with regards to their practises affecting the local financial sector. The law sets out 
capital adequacy rules that the foreign institutions should follow which are based on: common 
internal controls; minimum levels of provisions; limitations with regards to connected lending; 
big exposures and concentration constraints; restrictions on foreign exchange exposures; base 
reserve requirements; and restrictions on fixed assets among others (Moza Banco SA, 2012). 
 
The import and export of foreign currency is relatively easy in Mozambique. The Mozambique 
central banks will only step in and help foreign financial institutions that lack finances to 
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sustain themselves. Foreign Financial institutions are allowed to utilise the SWIFT and Telex 
systems (IMF, 2009). However, making sure that there is existence of world-wide access to 
financial services remains a policy obstacle that is shared across all countries of the SADC 
region.  
  
2.6 AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN TANZANIA 
  
2.6.1 Inception of Financial Liberalisation in Tanzania 
The idea of financial liberalisation has been considered in Tanzania since the 1980's. Interest 
and commitment was first shown when the government sort to restructure its financial norms 
to open its market to foreign institutions. This was however only implemented in 1990’s 
because of fear of aggressive foreign investments and buy outs 'big bang' situation to 
(Odhimbo, 2011).      
 
The country saw it fit to first get to a relatively comfortable level of financial stability and 
national productivity before opening foreign financial institutions. The liberalisation process 
involved the Bank of Tanzania in 1992 losing its responsibility to dictate interest rates but 
would only retain responsibility of maximum lending rates; passing of the Foreign Exchange 
Act of 1992 which superseded Exchange Control Ordinance; Doing away with the interest rate 
ceiling of 31% and in its place the 91-day Treasury Bill Auction in 1993 begun (Odhimbo, 
2011).   
 
In April 1993 establishments known as bureau-de-change markets that would allow the bank 
of Tanzania to change or trade with foreign currency was introduced. This was an opportunity 
for Bill of Trade (BOT) to monitor its liquidity risk exposure and dictate its exchange rates. 
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August 1993 saw the exchange rates standardized and commercial banks given the opportunity 
to take put in foreign auctions.  The years 1994, 1995 and 1996 saw the doctrine of sustaining 
a positive real deposit rate formally put to an end, the liquidity asset ratio stopped and the 
liquidity asset ratio abolished respectively (IMF, 2009). 
 
According to Odhimbo, (2011) financial liberalisation had a lot of negative results in the 
Tanzanian economy. This resulted in a steady reduction in domestic lending to the private 
sector, unpredictable financial depth, big differences between lending and deposit rates, high 
cost of borrowing and volatile exchange rates. Pre-financial reforms saw a higher rate of 
savings and investments compared to the post-financial reforms period. There was a general 
decrease of loans given to the private sector recorded as   28.62% in 1991 to 6.98% in 1998.   
 
2.6.2 Interest Rates Behaviour Before and After Liberalisation in Tanzania 
Pre-financial liberalisation Tanzanian interest rates were monitored by the East African 
Currency Board (EACB). The Board only oversaw the interest rates on government securities 
and did not involve itself with local commercial bank interest rates. There was emphasis on 
keeping the Treasury bill below that of the UK. Independently the dominant banks in Tanzania 
mirrored UK interest rates with no significant resultant change with regards to deposit rates in 
the country. The deposit rates reacted as follows: it decreased from 3.5% per annum in 1961 to 
3% per annum in 1962 and remained unchanged until 1964. The interest rate later increased to 
3.5% in 1965 and maintained that until 1966 (Williamson and Mohar, 1998). 
 
Following the increase in interest rates, it was noted small insignificant fluctuation in the 
deposit rates was largely caused by the tight grip the local commercial banks had on the local 
interest rates. The policies that allowed commercial banks to dictated local interest rates were 
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changed after the Arusha Declaration of April 1967 with introduction of government dictated 
fixed interest rates in Tanzania (Williamson and Mohar, 1998).  
In 1968 the government reduced and maintained a Treasury bill rate of 4.3% until 1982 with 
an increase in 1983 of 5.00% and 5.70% in 1985. This was done in the government’s favour to 
allow it to borrow from the banking sector at a lower cost. There was however a rapid decline 
in the real interest rate throughout this period, the highest recorded at -26.95% in 1981 due to 
the high inflation rate of the Tanzanian shilling during this period (Odhimbo, 2011).    
 
According to the IMF (2009) the bank rate for Treasury Bills was also dictated by the 
government during this period. This saw the nominal bank rate set at 5.00% from 1967 to 1977, 
6.00% from 1979 to 1986. However the real bank rate experienced a negative trend with a low 
of -28.88% in 1 due to the high inflation 1985. The normal lending rates were adjusted to 7% 
in 1967, 6.5% in 1968 through to 1977, 6.54% in 1978 and 13% in 1984. Regardless of these 
adjustments the real rate showed a negative trend throughout this period. Deposit rates were 
also administratively fixed. The government fixed it at 4% per annum from 1967 to 1984 and 
4.5% in 1985. The real deposit rate however showed a persistent negative trend.    
    
Looking at figure 2.7 below, the interest rates began showing positive gains as a result of a 
change of course and principles influencing the government’s control of the finance sector. The 
figure below shows the trend of interest rates and inflation rates in Tanzania from 1978 to 1989. 
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  Figure 2.7: Trends of Interest Rates and Inflation Rate in Tanzania (1978-1989). 
 
 Source: Odhimbo (2011)  
After further loosening of policies within the financial sector governing the interest rates in 
Tanzania in the early 1990s, there were significant increments in the real and nominal interest 
rates as follows; The treasury bill in 1995 was at 40.33%, 1994 saw the deposit rate at 26% and 
an increase in nominal and real lending rates. The figure below shows the trend of interest and 
inflation rates in Tanzania from 1995 to 2005.  
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 Figure 2.8: Trends of Interest Rates and Inflation Rate in Tanzania (1995-2005). 
 
Source: Odhimbo (2011) 
2.7 AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN MADAGASCAR 
 
2.7.1 The Liberalization process 
Madagascar made efforts towards financial liberalization in the late 1980's. This was through 
two International Development Appointment adjustments that resulted in positive and negative 
results in the economy. Huge backing came from the World Bank and these efforts were 
reciprocated by the local banks dedication and the governments drive towards budgetary 
reforms in the private financial sector. This conducive environment hence promoted trade 
liberalization. However due to lack of attention from the government and banks the public 
sector and the civil service suffered (Ikhide, 2015).    
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Looking back on the liberalization attempt by Madagascar shows that privatization is key in 
sustaining trade and financial changes. Findings from an OED audit of the projects showed that 
the government’s lack of full commitment to these restructuring processes led to the poor 
performance in the public sector. Privatization through transparency, publication of reforms on 
the social safety net programs, clarity on the key business objectives and performances, banks 
and borrowers clearing out the nitty-gritty details of their contracts by agreeing on standardized 
set of rules (Ikhide, 2015).     
 
Madagascar after its independence in 1972 took it on itself to empower its local business 
enterprises. This was through giving these local enterprises monopoly in trading with hopes of 
benefiting and building a stronger local economy (IMF, 2015). The government strictly 
promoted a policy which encouraged domestic production that would discourage importation 
of goods. Huge financial external debt was experienced resulting in the government 
restructuring its trade policies with backing from the International Monetary fund and banking 
restructures.    
Government sort to approve two policies which covered local and foreign trade and the highly 
neglected public sector; the Industry and Trade Policy Adjustment Credit (ITPAC) approved 
in 1987 and the Public-Sector Adjustment Credit (PSAC) approved in 1988.  ITPAC main aim 
was to create a liberal environment that would encourage local and foreign trade. This was a 
move towards restructuring the public banking and investment sector.  PSAC main agenda was 
to restructure the way public resources were distributed putting a close eye on public 
investments and expenditure, change the way the banking system dealt with public resources 
and aim at creating clarity and justifying public businesses (IMF, 2015).   
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2.7.2 Experiences Post- Liberalization in Madagascar 
ITPAC policies prove to be quite successful. This was achieved through the government 
loosening its hand in the control of prices and profit gains, justified and reduced import taxes, 
stopped restrictions on the import and export quantities and restructured the exchange rate 
policies making it more beneficial to traders (IMF, 2011).  
 
According to IMF, (2015) PSAC also experienced success. The first phase involved 
restructuring of the budget process benefitting the public sector and allowing the private 
banking system to get involved in implementing PSAC policies. However, the second phase 
experienced a slow down due to lack of resolve of minor issues which intern led to the 
termination of the third phase. From the onset the policies structure was unresolved. This was 
due to rushed implementation pressured by the banks that were to benefit although there was 
no surety from the debtors. Lack of accountability of the institutions involved also played a 
role in this policies collapse.   
 
The policies and goals were not outlined and adhered to. Changes that were made in the public 
business sector were not clearly defined and shared with the public. The government was not 
being clear with the criteria it followed in privatizing enterprises. It took it on itself to take 
control of public businesses that were performing poorly. Public sector businesses that stayed 
afloat or that were successful were never considered by government for privatization. A 1995 
audit highlighted that the government had privatized 100 enterprises which was putting a huge 
strain on the government resources (IMF, 2009).  
 
Madagascar experienced a lot of political instabilities in 1991 – 1993. This led to older existing 
policies being restructured to political ends. Funding for financial liberalization projects were 
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put to an end due to lack of resolve of issues that were carried on from the previous regime.  
This particularly affected private business restructuring process that were instead replaced by 
policies that were less beneficial and did not promote liberal financial environments. Civil 
service restructuring and changes did not take off at the time. Political liberalisation became 
more important to achieve and took centre stage over financial liberalisation in the public sector 
(IMF, 2015). 
 
2.7.2.1 Social Characteristics of adjustment  
The new environment brought about by privatization of the public sector required that the 
public adjust and adapt to the new norms (IMF, 2011). In 1988 a companion Economic 
Management and Social Action Support Project was launched in order to counteract and ease 
the effects on the public.  The project proves to be very costly for both the government and 
banks. This was due to poor initiation and lack of a concrete plan to reduce the impact caused 
by this environment on the underprivileged. Implementation of the strategies only took place 
5 years after the privatization begun.      
      
Political influence though small, played a role in creating unfriendly environments for 
privatisation of the public enterprises. The process of privatisation although having faced many 
challenges, seemed to have had a positive effect on the people financially. However, had the 
government and the banking sector timeously streamlined and refined the reform process, the 
resultant gains and benefits would have been more significant.  
 
2.7.3 Experience during Liberalization Process in the Madagascar. 
The government and banks got too involved in trying to resolve the minor processes that would 
satisfy successful privatisation of the public sector. This took too long resulting in them 
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ignoring the bigger policy issues that would have made a bigger impact in the reform process. 
The government and banks should have formulated and concentrated on major frameworks 
than tried to manage and micromanage every business entity.  A well-designed formula for 
reforms, transparency and accountability in the process is necessary for the privatizations 
success (IMF, 2011). 
 
Lack of attention and full involvement by government on the restructuring of public businesses 
and the civil service led to the poor outcomes of the privatization process. More involvement 
of banks and government when it came to trade and financial liberalization in the private sector 
led to its success. This shows that more involvement in the policy making and their 
implementation by both government and banks results to more positive outcomes in the 
liberalization process in both private and public sector (IMF, 2015). 
 
Although privatisation played a role in the liberalization process, it took too long to privatise 
most of the public enterprises. There was an attempt to clean up the finances and accounts of 
acquired banks but this did not prevent the repercussions of its overindulgences from ensuing.  
There was an attempt by the central bank to pay off the excesses of the public banks by credit 
expansions that led to a liquidity crisis in 1991. Had the banks been privatised this credit 
expansion would not have been allowed (IMF, 2011).   
 
According to IMF, (2011) transparency in the privatisation processes of the public sector was 
key in creating confidence in the public during the reform process. The parties involved 
especially the public should be well aware of the reform process and assured that there is equal 
and fair treatment of all stake holders. Controlled foreign investments and balanced ethnic 
opportunities for the Malagasy population would have created equal opportunities for all. 
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Maintaining the process of privatisation of public enterprises would require the formulation of 
a solid contingency plan to convince the public to accept the process. This would have sufficed 
at the time of political and social instability that Madagascar was in. 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
The chapter has focused on presenting an overview of financial liberalisation in the SADC 
region, specifically looking at the sample overview completed in this chapter has made it clear 
that the different member states of the SADC region, have implemented the process of financial 
liberalization in so many different strategies, hence the results, experiences and outcomes vary 
from country to country.   It has been observed that the SADC member states’ financial markets 
are too small, with the exception South Africa, the reason for this could be low levels of 
financial diffusion and high interest margins in many SADC countries. In total, post financial 
liberalization the SADC region has maintained a strong economic growth and future prospects 
are promising. Most SADC member states have steadily implemented banking liberalisation, 
slowly sequencing the process and are correct indeed. Financial reform is a very sensitive topic 
and the domestic interests of different consumers, stability and efficiency have to be carefully 
considered. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMWORK 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of financial 
liberalization on financial instability. The chapter consists of three parts; the first part covers 
the theoretical literature focusing on presenting the hypothetical impact of financial 
liberalization on financial instability. The second section focuses on the empirical literature 
discussing the available studies on the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability. 
The final section presents an assessment of literature.  
 
3.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
There have been theories which have been documented to explain the role of financial 
liberalization in emerging economies. This section will discuss two prominent theories that are 
closely linked to financial instability which are the McKinnon and Shaw model and the De 
Meza and Webb model.  
 
3.2.1 McKinnon and Shaw Model  
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) assumed that in a country, where interest rates are 
liberalized, there will be an increase in the real interest rate which will lead to increase in 
domestic savings, increased investments and ultimately lead to economic growth. The essence 
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behind the McKinnon and Shaw model revealed that financial liberalization results in capital 
inflow. The increase in financial inflow boosts domestic savings and capital allocation.   
 
In the beginning of the 1970’s, developing countries experienced resilient declines in economic 
growth and impacted greatly on the financial systems. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
pointed out that the declines in the economic growth and deteriorating investment performance 
was caused by the interest rate ceilings, direct credit allocation policies, foreign exchange 
regulations, dense taxation in the financial sector, restrictions in the allocation of credit and 
extremely stringent reserve requirements. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) then categorised 
these regulations as financial repression. According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
financial repression refers to a system whereby the government imposes interest rate ceilings, 
direct credit allocation policies, foreign exchange regulations, dense taxation in the financial 
sector, restrictions in the allocation of credit and extremely stringent reserve requirements. 
 
Having pointed out financial repression, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) encouraged 
financial liberalization, which according Ikhide (2015) is a policy implemented to ensure full 
financial freedom in the economy, independence of central banks from state/government, 
removal of government determined differential interest rates schemes, freedom in banks in 
chasing profits, de- nationalization (removal of restrictions in bank ownership) and complete 
foreign ownership freedom.  
 
Financial repression came along with several negative effects. In the form of interest rate 
ceiling, financial repression meant keeping the interest rate at a level below the free market 
rate. According to Sibanda (2012), this is because if the allocation of credit is not price-based, 
then it gives the state an authority to govern who is accesses credit and who is not. Savings and 
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capital formation in turn declines hence impacting negatively on the country’s financial system. 
Ikhide (2015) highlighted that government’s direct control suppresses interest rates and may 
also undermine the effectiveness of the monetary policy and encouraging capital escalation. 
These arguments against financial repression made visible the need for countries to implement 
financial liberalization in financial systems.  
 
The policy recommendation provided by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) was that 
liberalization of the financial sector of countries is an attempt to achieve economic growth 
promotion, by letting the interest rates to modify freely according to market mechanisms and 
not by government mechanisms. According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
entrepreneurs have more returns on investments in high-yield projects and in this way, higher 
economic growth is expected. Figure 3.1 below depicts the effect of the movement from 
financial repression to financial liberalization as supported by the McKinnon and Shaw model.  
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  Figure 3.1: The effect of movement from financial repression to financial liberalization 
 
Source: Sibanda (2012) 
  
In Figure 3.1 above, the vertical axis shows the real rate of interest whereas the horizontal axis 
shows both savings and investment. The SS curve is the savings function which is a positive 
function of real interest rates. The II represents the investment function. If the market was 
allowed to operate freely, equilibrium in the market for loanable funds would be attained at 
point E, where amount saved is equal to amount invested (I*) and the market-determined rate 
of interest would be r*. Line C represents an interest rate ceiling (as a result of financial 
repression) which is an administratively fixed nominal interest rate that holds the real rate 
below its equilibrium level. If the interest rate ceiling is imposed on deposit rates, actual savings 
would be limited to I1. Since the ceiling is applied only to deposit, but not loan rates, the 
investor/borrower faces a lending rate r2 which would be the market clearing rate at constrained 
investment of I1. However, interest rate ceilings usually apply to both deposit and lending 
interest rates. In this case, both savings and investment would be restricted to I1, AB amount 
of investment opportunities are not met, and the investment undertaken would be inefficient. 
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According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), with financial liberalisation, interest rates 
rise, increasing savings and also investment. This process would continue until the real interest 
rate is at R*, where savings are enough to satisfy investment. McKinnon and Shaw therefore 
advocated the liberalization of such repressed financial systems so as to increase savings and 
investment, and consequently promote economic growth. 
 
According to Basu (2002), the McKinnon and Shaw model is built on the unrealistic 
assumption of perfect competition, which is particularly arbitrary in the case of less developed 
countries. Basu (2002) classified this assumption as unrealistic as it is possible to argue that 
perfect competition is forever impractical and impossible in all markets and countries, 
especially in credit markets. Given, that banking sectors are oligopolistic, the outcome of 
financial liberalization could perfectly be a monopoly result whereby the decline in loans and 
the increase in the real interest rates are higher scales than that under-perfect competition. This 
result may happen due to the likelihood of insufficient regulation over banking practices, which 
contribute to undue risk-taking, particularly when there is deposit insurance. In this situation, 
the banks are beneficiaries of an unfair bet against the state. For instance, if the project banks 
have financed successful banks a lot profit, if the projects are unsuccessful they rely on the 
state to save them.  
 
Basu (2002) added that in the existence of uncertainty in a loan market, changes in the rate of 
interest alone do not assure clearance of the loan market. The statistics that banks do not keep 
up a constant credit standard for all the borrowers, more than market imperfections allows 
biased lending policy by the banks. Accordingly, the difference in access to the loan market 
for different borrowers is based on the credit standard borrowers can actually offer. Under these 
41 
 
settings, free banking and liberalization of the loan markets does not assure that flexibility in 
interest rate variation would establish the equilibrium characteristics assumed by the financial 
liberalization thesis.  
 
Another critique comes from the theory of Taylor (1983) and Van Wijnbergen (1983). The 
critique suggests that higher interest rates from financial liberalization might remain unchanged 
or will decrease the total supply of funds. This is due to hedge effects, which may not appear 
in the case whereby total supply of funds may not be affected, or to limit effects, which may 
reduce it. Hedge effects are due to substitution of hedge assets. Gold and land are the most 
obvious examples, for bank deposits brought about by higher interest rates.  
 
3.2.2 De Meza and Webb Model 
The De Meza and Webb (1987) model is another important theory which has emerged to 
explain how financial liberalization may result in financial instability. According to the model, 
financial instability is defined as a decrease in the ability to repay bank loans. Financial 
liberalization is assumed to result in an increase in capital flows which is usually followed by 
a credit boom. When there is a credit boom, the probability of over-borrowing is high. This is 
supported by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) who argued that the probability of crashes in 
emerging markets is large in the event that the capital account is open.   
 
The model assumes that entrepreneurs borrow money from banks to start up projects. Due to 
financial liberalization there will be an increase in loanable funds due to an increase in capital 
flows. This will therefore intensify bank competition as the banks scramble for customers, 
which may result in a decline in franchise value of banks. In a bid to cope up with the 
competition, banks may respond by accepting risk exposures which are beyond the usual 
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standards so as to increase profits. Bezemer, et al. (2015) highlights that some of the strategies 
which banks can engage in include economising on screening and monitoring efforts. Banks 
may also gamble on their loan allocation decisions. This is supported by Dell’Arricia and 
Marquez (2006) who indicated that financial liberalization results in reduced screening by 
banks which may increase the risk of the project. Lorenzeni (2008) also suggests that 
competitive financial contracts may result in excessive borrowing et ante and excessive 
volatility ex post. 
 
Following the De Meza and Webb (1987) model as a basis, the study of Bezemer, et al. (2015) 
provides a simplified framework for examining the relationship between financial 
liberalization and instability. The study suggests that entrepreneurs borrow money from banks 
to launch projects. We assume the project returns are the same for all entrepreneurs, but they 
differ in their success probability. Financial liberalization attracts riskier entrepreneurs with 
low project success probabilities into the pool of borrowing entrepreneurs, which lowers the 
average project success probability. However, a decline in the average project success 
probability is not necessarily problematic, because financial liberalization also leads to a 
decline in borrowing cost, so more borrowing by risky entrepreneurs might be socially 
efficient. Overall, financial liberalization may increase or decrease the degree of over-
borrowing, and therefore, it has an ambiguous effect on financial stability.  
 
3.2.2.1 Entrepreneurs 
The model considers a range of risk neutral entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur holds a risky 
project. A project requires a unit of labor and a unit of investment, individually. Entrepreneurs 
do not carry their wealth which is an implication of entrepreneurs having to request for a loan 
from banks so that they can start a project Bezemer, et al. (2015). Each loan incurs a bank 
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interest at the lending rate 𝑟. The started projects return a return 𝑅 if they are successful and 
zero if not. Entrepreneurs vary in the probability of project success 𝑝𝑖. It is assumed that 𝑝𝑖 is 
uniformly distributed between zero and one. The higher the probability of the project success 
𝑝𝑖, the more reliable the project is. 
 
An entrepreneur will start a project, if the returns on investment are greater than the reservation 
payoff 𝜇 that equals the opportunity cost of labor. This means an entrepreneur is going to invest 
when the following equation is true: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑅−𝑟)≥𝜇.                                                                                                                       (3.1) 
 
For a minimal entrepreneur with 𝑝𝑖≡𝑝𝑡, the above expression holds with equality: 
𝑝𝑡(𝑅−𝑟)=𝜇.                                                                                                                      (3.2) 
 
Given Equation 3.2, the success probability of the marginal entrepreneur equals 𝑝𝑡=𝜇𝑅−𝑟. 
According to De Meza and Webb (1987), the minimal entrepreneur has the lowest 𝑝𝑖 in the 
cluster of investing entrepreneurs. For the cluster of investing entrepreneurs the following 
expression holds: 
𝑝𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1                                                                                                               (3.3) 
 
According to Bezemer, et al. (2015) the issue of asymmetric information comes in since it is 
impossible for banks to detect the project success probabilities of entrepreneurs. It is then safe 
to assume that banks know the probability sharing and the average project success probability 
which can be denoted by 𝜋 of entrepreneurs starting investment projects. Looking at Equation 
2, it is possible for all entrepreneurs with 𝑝≥𝜇𝑅−𝑟 to start a project. Therefore 𝜋 can be written 
as a function of the lending rate 𝑟 as shown below: 
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𝜋(𝑟)=𝐸(𝑝|𝑝≥𝜇𝑅−𝑟).                                                                                                   (3.4) 
 
As the 𝑝 is consistently distributed, 𝑝~ [0, 1], the provisional expectation in Equation 4 can be 
written as: 
(𝑟)=12+12(𝜇𝑅−𝑟) if 𝑅>𝑟.                                                                                          (3.5) 
 
Equation 3.5 controls how a change in the lending rate, 𝑟, affects the average project success 
probability 𝜋 of entrepreneurs starting projects.  
 
3.2.2.2 Banking sector  
Bezemer, et al (2015) further assume that banks are risk neutral and aim to optimize their profits 
in a competitive market. As highlighted above, banks lend to entrepreneurs at the market rate 
𝑟 and take deposits, repaying a risk-free rate of interest 𝜌. In an economy were capital controls 
exist, 𝜌 is assumed to be greater than in an open economy with free capital flows. The fact that 
banks are unable to detect the success probability of the launched projects, 𝑝, they only know 
the underlying distribution and leads to the consequence of banks setting a combining lending 
rate 𝑟.  
 
Banks have to hold a fixed percentage, 𝑎, of deposits in the form of required reserves at the 
central bank. The central bank does not reimburse any interest on required reserves. Therefore, 
the required reserves operate as a tax on banks. Owing to required reserves, banks only fund a 
fraction (1− 𝑎) of loans for a single unit of deposits. This then suggests that for a one unit 
increase in loans, deposits will increase by 1(1−𝑎) ≡𝛽, where 1≤𝛽<∞.  An increase in 𝛽 is 
linked with an increase in required reserves. On the other hand, financial liberalization indicates 
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a fall in 𝛽. As a result of the required reserves, the effective opportunity cost of capital becomes 
𝛽𝜌 (with 𝜌 denoting the risk-free rate of interest). 
 
In a country without reserve requirements 𝛽=1, the opportunity cost of capital will simply be 
𝜌. As banks function in a competitive environment, they end up setting the lending rate such 
that profits are zero. This implies that banks grant loans, if their expected payment on a project 
loan, 𝜋𝑟, equals the risk-free payment 𝛽𝜌: 
𝜋𝑟=𝛽𝜌.                                                                                                                   (3.6) 
 
Equation 3.6 identifies the locus of project success probabilities and lending rates that make 
the bank earn the required rate of return. 
 
3.2.2.3 Market equilibrium  
The Market equilibrium subject is best illustrated by Figure 3.2 below. Equations 3.5 and 3.6 
measure the equilibrium lending rate 𝑟∗. Given the lending rate, investors decide whether to 
borrow from banks, for instance all entrepreneurs with 𝑝𝑖≥𝜇𝑅−𝑟 will borrow. On the basis of 
the entrepreneur’s choices, it is possible to measure the equilibrium average project success 
probability 𝜋∗.  
Equation 3.5 is the 𝐵𝐵 curve in Figure 3.9 and an increase in 𝑟 is associated with a rise in 𝜋. 
As 𝑟 approaches R, 𝜋 becomes very huge. The shape of Equation 6 is 𝐿𝐿 curve in Figure 10, 
and is more forthright. It is monotonically declining in the lending rate 𝑟, with the risk-free 
payment 𝛽𝜌 determining a lower bound on 𝑟. Below this starting point, banks do not lend any 
money. If 𝑟 was below 𝛽𝜌, banks’ expected payment would be lesser than 𝜋𝑟, suggesting that 
banks would be making losses. Furthermore, there exists an upper bound on 𝑟. Any equilibrium 
should satiate 𝛽𝜌≤𝑟≤2𝛽𝜌. 
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The intersection of the two curves in Equations 3.5 and 3.6 determine the equilibrium values 
of 𝑟∗and 𝜋∗. 
 
  Figure 3.2: Market equilibrium 
 
Source: Bezemer, et al. (2015) 
 
The connection of the BB and LL curves defines the equilibrium values of 𝑟∗and 𝛑∗. The solid 
horizontal line is the lower bound on π∗, and the solid vertical line is the upper bound on 𝑟∗.  
 
3.2.2.4 Over-borrowing 
De Meza and Webb (1987) highlighted that it is essential to demonstrate that the market 
equilibrium is characterized by over-borrowing. It then becomes important to also look at the 
effect of financial liberalization on over-borrowing. To measure over-borrowing, the market 
equilibrium is compared to the generally efficient equilibrium, whereby all projects with a 
progressive net present value are undertaken. Generally, efficient projects have an expected 
return above the opportunity cost of labour 𝜇 adding the effective opportunity cost of capital 
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𝛽𝜌. Accordingly, in the generally efficient equilibrium, only projects with 𝑝𝑖𝑅≥𝛽𝜌+𝜇 are 
undertaken, this implies, for general efficiency 𝑝𝑖>𝑝𝑒=𝛽𝜌+𝜇𝑅. If there is over-borrowing, the 
minimal borrower will have success probability 𝑝𝑡< 𝑝𝑒.  
 
In the attempt to prove that the market equilibrium is characterized by over-borrowing, 
Bezemer, et al. (2015) assumed that there is no over-borrowing to a point that 𝑝𝑡≥ 𝑝𝑒. The 
minimal entrepreneur then needs to satisfy the general optimality condition: 
𝑝𝑡𝑅≥𝛽𝜌+𝜇,                                                                                                       (3.7) 
 
After substitution the participation constraint (𝑅−𝑟) =𝜇 (Equation 2) to obtain: 
𝑝𝑡𝑅≥𝛽𝜌+ (𝑅−𝑟),                                                                                                 (3.8) 
This means 𝑝𝑡𝑟≥𝛽𝜌, implying that, banks would yield profits on loans to the minimal investor. 
As the minimal entrepreneur is the most risky entrepreneur in the pool of entrepreneurs who 
launch investment projects, this outcome is mismatched with the zero-profit condition of banks 
(Equation 3.6). Therefore, as according to De Meza and Webb (1987), the market equilibrium 
is characterized by over-borrowing as a number of risky entrepreneurs borrow and start 
investment projects. Over-borrowing indicates that the average project success probability 𝜋 is 
too low as compared to the average project success probability according to the socially optimal 
equilibrium 𝜋𝑒 since 𝑝𝑡<𝑝𝑒. As a result, over-borrowing equals the difference 𝜋𝑒 –𝜋>0, this is 
depicted Figure 3.3 below. 
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 Figure 3.3: Market equilibrium and over-borrowing. 
 
  Source: Bezemer, et al. (2015)  
 
The 𝑟∗and 𝜋∗ show the equilibrium borrowing cost and average project success probability.  
The 𝜋𝑒 denotes for the socially optimal average project success probability.  The difference 
between 𝜋∗ and 𝜋𝑒 gives over-borrowing.  
 
3.2.2.5 Impact of financial liberalization on the equilibrium and over-borrowing 
De Meza and Webb (1987) consider two types of financial liberalization: a decline in reserve 
requirements, and a decrease in capital controls. Liberalizing reserve requirements implies that 
banks need to hold a lower fraction of deposits in the form of required reserves at the central 
bank. In the model, this is captured by a fall in 𝛽. Capital account liberalization enables 
entrepreneurs to obtain cheaper foreign funds, leading to a decrease in 𝜌. Both a fall in 𝛽 and/or 
𝜌, implies a drop in the required return of banks. 
 As depicted below in Figure 3.4, financial liberalization causes a downward shift of the 𝐿𝐿 
curve. This leads to a decline in the equilibrium cost of borrowing from 𝑟∗ to 𝑟∗′. This leads to 
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a problem of riskier entrepreneurs borrowing and starting projects. When riskier entrepreneurs 
borrow from banks, the equilibrium project success probability decreases from 𝜋∗ to 𝜋∗′. 
 
 Figure 3.4: Impact of financial liberalization on the equilibrium 
 
 Source: Bezemer, et al. (2015)  
 
The 𝜋∗ and 𝜋∗′ denote the equilibrium average project success probabilities before and post 
financial liberalization correspondingly. 𝑟∗ and 𝑟∗′ indicate the equilibrium interest rates before 
and post financial liberalization, correspondingly.  
 
The analysis of the De Meza and Webb (1987) suggests that the impact of financial 
liberalization on financial instability is an empirical matter. The fact that borrowing by 
entrepreneurs with lower success probabilities can be socially desirable implies that financial 
instability need not rise with financial liberalization.  
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3.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
There are empirical studies which have been carried out to examine the relationship between 
financial liberalization and financial instability. Of the available studies, Dell’ Arricia and 
Marquez (2006), established that financial liberalization lessens screening efforts, leaving 
entrepreneurs risk projects which are highly exposed to shocks. Banks may also be willing to 
accept the risk when doing loan allocations, by moderating risk in relation to return although 
financial liberalization improves credit constraints that are due to capital market imperfection. 
This will in turn increase financial instability.  The study of Bezemer et al. (2015) recognizes 
that entry of risky entrepreneurs due to a decrease in borrowing costs can be another channel 
through which financial liberalization may result in financial instability. Utilizing impaired 
loans as a measure of financial liberalization the authors established that countries which are 
more liberalized experienced more financial instability during the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
There are studies which have established that financial liberalization results in a credit boom. 
According to Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) over-borrowing after liberalization is often a 
result of liberalization, such that financial liberalization results in increased inflow of capital, 
which is then followed by a domestic credit boom.  Of the available studies in this category, 
The IMF World Economic Outlook 2011 survey report shows that in 19 advanced and 28 
emerging economies for the period from 1960 to 2011, financial inflows systematically 
continue credit booms. In addition, Magud et al. (2012) examined 25 emerging economies and 
found out that enormous capital inflow and less flexible exchange rate regimes significantly 
raise domestic credit. In another study Calderón and Kubota (2012) established that gross 
private capital inflows significantly impacts on the probability of domestic credit booms.  This 
is also consistent with Furceri, Guichard, and Rusticelli (2012).  
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Rancière, Tornell and Westerman (2006), further note that liberalized economies experience 
more crises and are open to more severe output contractions during financial crises , this is 
because the greater the debt levels in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), the greater the 
probability of failure. Studies by Bordo, Barry, Daniela, Maria, Martinez, and Andrew (2001), 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), Barrell et al. (2010), and Rodrik (2005), amongst many, also 
show correlation between financial liberalization and the beginning of a financial crisis. 
 
Financial crisis are tied to quick reversals in international capital flows which are prompted 
mainly by changes in international investment conditions. Such sudden capital reversals are 
likely to trigger sudden current account adjustments resulting in currency and banking crises. 
This is in line with the second generation of currency crises model of Krugman (1979) which 
suggest that the failure of exchange rate regimes on the grounds that weak fundamentals lead 
to foreign investors pulling resources out of the country resulting in a reduction of foreign 
reserves. On the other hand Obstfeld (1996) suggests that currency crises may also occur 
regardless of in-depth fundamentals, this is because of self-fulfilling anticipations, projected 
attacks and changes in market observations.  
 
One form of the Third- Generation model characterizes the crisis to implicit assurances offered 
by the local banks in developing countries contributing to a substantial inflow of short-term 
capital which ends up being unsustainable. This then consistently leads to an asset price bubble 
that is intended to surge and reverse the capital inflows. Another form of the third-generation 
model of Krugman recognises the presence of ‘Fragile Financial Institutions’ as the main 
source of the accumulation of unhedged short-term borrowing denominated in foreign 
currency. According to Obstfeld (1996) an unexpected change in market sentiment leads to 
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panic and investor reactions which also carry out reversals in these capital flows. The outcome 
is that illiquid assets turn to be insolvent and then the currency peg eventually breaks down.  
 
In an empirical study Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) examined the short-run and long-run 
effects of financial liberalization on capital markets by constructing a comprehensive timetable 
of financial liberalization in 28 developed and emerging economies since 1973. They used 
three measures of financial liberalization: firstly, the capital account liberalization (capital 
mobility); secondly domestic financial system liberalization (regulations on deposit interest 
rates, credit allocation lending interest rates, and foreign currency deposits) and lastly, the stock 
market liberalization (progression of regulations on the purchase of shares in the domestic stock 
market by foreigners, banishment of capital, and banishment of interest and dividends). 
 The authors came up with two conclusions:  
 
Firstly, even if liberalization leads to extreme financial booms and busts in the short-run, these 
booms and busts have not intensified in the long run. In actual fact, regardless of the report that 
financial integration leads to unstable capital markets around the world, stock market cycles 
become less evident after liberalization. The short-run effects of liberalization vary across 
developed and emerging markets. The evidence from emerging markets shows larger booms 
and crashes in the immediate result of liberalization.  
 
Secondly, even though liberalization has been an uninterrupted process in most developed 
markets, it has been branded by reversals in emerging markets, in which capital controls and 
restrictions are at times reintroduced. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) also discovered that the 
pattern of liberalization differs across regions, with developed countries liberalizing first their 
stock markets and developing economies opening first their domestic financial sector.  
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According to Tornell, Westermann and Martinez (2004), even though  a number of studies 
have claimed that financial liberalization is not good for growth because of the crises associated 
with it, the author argues that it does also come with benefits.  Tornell et al. (2004) in their 
empirical analysis indicate that, in the countries with evident credit market imperfections, 
financial liberalization results to even more growth, but as well as to a higher incidence of 
crises. In fact, most of the fastest-growing countries of the developing world have experienced 
boom-bust cycles. Tornell et al. (2004) suggest that liberalization results in faster growth as it 
results in lessened financial constraints, but this happens when agents take on credit risk, which 
in turn makes the economy fragile and exposed to a crisis. This study thus suggests that 
international bank flows that follow financial liberalization are an essential element of creating 
a rapid-growth track.  
 
Baldicci, de Mello and Inchauste (2002) examined the impact of financial crises on the 
occurrence of poverty and on the distribution of income in Mexico. These authors identified 
the following channels through which financial crises affect poverty and income distribution: 
Relative prices adjustment following currency depreciation resulting in an increase in the price 
of imported food and also domestic food prices. This negatively affects underprivileged 
individuals and households that are net consumers of food.  
A downward trend in economic activity after a crisis leading to a drop in earnings of equally 
the formal and informal-sector workers. Decreased working hours and real wage reduction 
negatively impact the earnings of the underprivileged. Changes in asset prices (wealth effects) 
following changes in interest rates and real estate prices affect the wealth of the better off. 
Decrease in spending (fiscal retrenchment) impacts on the volume of openly provided 
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fundamental social services and restricts the access of the underprivileged to these social 
services while their incomes are declining.  
 
It is interesting to note that in the SADC region, the major financial reforms implemented in 
the 1980s and 1990s were mostly financial liberalisation. Moyo, Nandwa, Oduor and Simpasa 
(2014) argue that financial liberalization will improve economic growth by promoting financial 
innovation and efficiency and competition in the banking industry. Arguments in favour of 
liberalisation hold that it increases the amount of resources, reduces the cost of debt, create 
completion that brings in efficiency, leading to a rise in investment and growth. On the 
contrary, financial liberalization may worsen asymmetric information in the financial sector 
and create competition that increases financial fragility of financial intermediaries such as 
banks. 
 
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Both theoretical and empirical literature show that there is no consensus regarding the impact 
of financial liberalization on financial instability in a country. The McKinnon and Show model 
views suggest that with financial liberalisation, interest rates will rise, increasing savings and 
also investment. This process will continue to a point whereby real interest rate is at 
equilibrium, where savings is enough to satisfy investment. McKinnon and Shaw therefore 
supported the liberalisation of repressed financial systems so as to increase savings and 
investment, and accordingly, promote economic growth. On the other hand De Meza and Webb 
(1987) model suggest that the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability is an 
empirical matter. The fact that borrowing by entrepreneurs with lower success probabilities can 
be socially desirable implies that financial instability need not rise with financial liberalization. 
The literature has also indicated that financial liberalization is another factor contributing to 
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credit booms, due to lessoned screening efforts which lead to excessive borrowing which might 
lead to a crisis. The next chapter presents the methodology which has been utilised to examine 
the relationship between the variables of interest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of the study was to examine the impact of financial liberalization on the 
financial instability in the selected SADC member states. Chapter Four used the literature as a 
foundation to pronounce the analytical framework that was adopted in this study. The sub-
sections of the study are as follows: Section 4.2 which specifies the model, Section 4.3 which 
defines the variables and expectation apriori and Section 4.4 which discusses the data sources. 
Section 4.5 outlays the methods of data analysis and the estimation techniques while the chapter 
will be concluded by Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The study was based on the De Meza and Webb (1987) model discussed in the theoretical 
section which links liberalization with financial instability. In the model, it is assumed that 
entrepreneurs borrow money from banks to start projects. As a country liberalise its financial 
sector, there will be more credit available which increases the degree of over-borrowing. In 
addition, due to excessive credit availability, this may attract risk entrepreneurs who are likely 
to default. Thus, as many entrepreneurs default, this amounts to financial sector instability. 
Bezemer, et al. (2015) applied this model and came up with the following mathematical 
function which has been revised and adopted in this study:  
ILRit = ƒ (FinReform, dT x FinReform, X)      (4.1) 
The empirical model used in the study is specified as follows: 
ILRit =α0 + β1FinReformit—p +β2 (dTglobal x FinReformit-p) + β3Private creditit  + β4GDPit + 
β5Government consumptionit  + β6Inflationit  +.µit…………………………………………………..(4.2)       
 
57 
 
Where ILR is the impaired loans ratio, 
FinLibit-p denotes the level of financial liberalization lagged to take into account the lagged 
response of impaired loans to financial liberalization.  
The variable dT represents a dummy variable measuring the financial crisis. The study took 
into account the 2008 global financial crisis (dTglobal) which assume values of 1 and 0 after and 
before the respective crisis. X represents a number of control variables 
            β4Xit   Private Credit 
           β5Xit   GDP,  
           β6Xit   Government consumption 
          β7Xit   Inflation,  
         t  represents time, 
        i represents country. 
 
Bezemer, et al. (2015) highlighted that financial liberalization is likely to cause a gradual 
adjustment to bank balance sheets and financial instability. To account for this, Equation 1 was 
estimated including a lag of the dependant variable. 
ILRit =α0 + a1 ILRit -1 + a2FinReformit—p +a2 (dTglobal x FinReformit-p) + β3Private creditit  + 
β4GDPit + β5Government consumptionit+ β6Inflationit  + .µit……………………………………………..(4.3)   
     
4.3 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND EXPECTATION APRIORI  
 
4.3.1 Impaired Loan Ratio (ILR) 
Financial instability is measured by impaired loan Ratio (ILR) which is a share of loans due by 
90 days in gross loans. This is consistent with Bezemer, et al. (2015). Figure 4.1 asserts that, 
after the financial crisis shock, there was a strident increase in the ratio of impaired loans in 
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total loans in the years 2008 and 2009. The rise in impaired loans was more in countries which 
had more financially liberalized sectors. Figure 4.1 also shows the total development of the 
impaired loans ratio (ILR) over time for a sample of 85 economies, differentiating between 
more and less financially liberalized countries.  
 
Figure 4.1: Impaired loans by level of financial liberalization  
 
Source: Bezemer, et al. (2015)  
 
4.3.2 Financial Reforms 
To capture financial liberalization, the study used financial reform Index of Abiad, Detragiache 
and Tressel (2010) which is based on seven dimensions of financial liberalization, ranging 
between 0 and 21. A country with a fully liberalized financial system has an index value of 21. 
The initial six-dimension rations financial liberalization, while the seventh element captures 
the strength of bank capital regulation and supervision. The first six dimensions of 
liberalization covers elements such as privatization; entry barriers; high reserve and credit 
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allocation requirements; Interest Rate Liberalization; Capital Accounts Liberalization and 
security market policies.  
 
The literature review section indicated that financial liberalization may cause financial 
instability after a shock. Thus the financial crisis will be treated as an external shock. In this 
case the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 Global financial crisis was interacted with the financial 
liberalization variable. Abaid, et al. (2010) also used the financial reform variable, while in this 
study, the empirical findings were financial reform platforms and a positive relationship with 
banking proficiency. 
 
4.3.3 Control Variables  
The study used the private credit, GDP per capita, and inflation government consumption as 
control variables. 
Private credit to the domestic sector as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) refers to 
financial resources provided to the local (domestic) financial institutions that find themselves 
short when trading as they contribute to GDP. Financial openness has a positive relationship 
with private credit in economies characterized by a competitive banking sector preceding 
financial liberalization. But, this effect is weaker and becomes negative in economies with 
imperfect banking competition (Balmaceda, Fischer and Ramirez, 2013). Credit to private 
sector is expected to have a negative relationship with financial instability. 
 
Balmaceda, et al. (2013), found that an increase in real per capita GDP serves as the indicator 
for economic growth. A negative relationship is expected between the variables controlling 
financial liberalization such as real per capita GDP and financial instability, as stated by the 
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McKinnon and Shaw model. Liberalized interest rates lead to increased investment, which 
ultimately leads to economic growth thus reducing financial instability.  
 
Inflation is measured by the GDP deflator. This has been debated by Ikhide (1992) and 
Odhiambo (2011) who argued that inflation negatively affects the holding of all groups of 
financial assets and not just a particular group. Inflation tends to encourage the holding of 
currency and discourage the holding of quasi-money. A higher inflation rate inspires 
households to trade purchased transaction services for money balances, thus enhancing the 
financial sector which further decline financial instability. The coefficient of inflation is 
therefore expected to be both negative and statistically significant. 
 
Government consumption measures the current expenditures for purchases of goods and 
services (including employee compensation) Balmaceda, et al. (2013). An increase in 
government expenditure on socio-economic and physical infrastructure encourages economic 
growth and thus reduces financial instability. Government consumption coefficient is therefore 
expected to be negative.  
 
4.4 DATA SOURCES 
The data used in the study was for the period from 1970 to 2012 for the four countries in the 
SADC region, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Madagascar. The choice for the 
countries to be included in the study was based on the availability of data. The data for impaired 
loan ratio was obtained from the DFID project data base.  The remaining variables namely 
private credit, per capita GDP, inflation and government consumption was obtained from the 
World Development Bank indicators in annual form.   
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4.5 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE  
The study utilised panel data given that four countries were utilised in the study. According to 
Hsiao, and Racine (2006), panel data usually gives the researcher a large number of data points, 
which increase the degrees of freedom and reduce the collinearity among explanatory variables. 
The study involved four countries namely, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Madagascar. The study was over a period of 42 years. Panel data model thus becomes the ideal 
model. 
 
Panel data also known as longitudinal data allows a researcher to analyse a number of important 
economic questions that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time-series data sets. To 
add on, panel data allows the control of omitted (unobserved and mismeasured) variables. In 
choosing the appropriate model between the fixed and random effects, the Hausman and the 
Likelihood tests were utilised.   
 
4.5.1 Panel Data Techniques 
There are generally two types of panel estimator approaches that can be engaged in financial 
research and these are random and fixed effects models. The most uncomplicated models are 
the fixed effects models as they allow the researcher to change cross-sectionals, however, not 
over time. The crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the unobserved 
individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model, or 
these effects are stochastic or not (Brooks, 2008). 
Advantages of using panel data: 
More accurate implication of model parameters. Panel data usually includes more degrees of 
freedom and more sample inconsistency than cross-sectional data which may be viewed as a 
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panel with T = 1, or time-series data which is a panel with N = 1, which improves the 
effectiveness of the econometric estimates (Brooks, 2008). 
Panel data allows greater capacity for capturing the difficulty of human behaviour unlike a 
time-series or single cross-section data. For example, constructing and testing more 
complicated behavioural hypotheses and controlling the impact of omitted variables (Hsiao, 
and Racine, 2006) 
Panel data generates more reliable predictions for individual outcomes by combining the data 
instead of running predictions of individual outcomes using the data on the individual in study. 
This methodology also provides micro foundations for aggregate data analysis. Aggregate data 
analysis often invokes the “representative agent” assumption (Brooks, 2008).   
 
Panel data simplifies calculation and statistical implication. It encompasses two dimensions 
which are cross-sectional and time series dimensions. Under common conditions, it is expected 
that the calculation of the panel data estimator would be more difficult than cross-sectional or 
time series data. Nevertheless, in most cases, the availability of panel data actually simplifies 
the calculations.  
 
4.5.1.1 The Random Effects Model 
The logic behind the random effects model is assumed by Brooks (2008) as the variation 
through entities and Bezemer, et al. (2015) as random and uncorrelated with the predictor or 
independent variables included in the model. An advantage of random effects is that you can 
include time invariant variables. In the fixed effects model, these variables are absorbed by the 
intercept. 
 
The random effects model was expressed as: 
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Yit = βXit + α + uit + εit        4.4 
The Random effects model assumes that, there are no perfect linear relationships among the 
explanatory variables; the expected value of α given all explanatory variables are constant: E 
(αi | Xi); α is uncorrelated with all elements of Xit; and the variance of α given all explanatory 
variables are constant: Var (αi | Xi). The random effect estimator is constant and asymptotically 
normally distributed as N gets large for fixed T.  Zero correlation between the observed 
explanatory variables and the unobserved effect: Cov (Xit, Α) =0, t=1, 2...T (Brooks, 2008). 
 
Random effects assume that the entity’s error term is not correlated with the forecasters which 
let time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables. In random-effects, the 
researcher needs to stipulate those individual characteristics that might or might not affect the 
predictor variables. The challenge that comes with this is that some variables may not be 
available thus resulting in omitted variables to be biased in the model. Random effects also 
allow the researcher to generalize the implications beyond the sample used in the model (Hsiao, 
and Racine, 2006). 
 
4.5.1.2 The Fixed Effects Model 
Researchers use fixed-effects (FE) when the researcher is particularly concerned about 
examining the effect of variables that change over time. Fixed effect models examine the 
relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity such as country, person, 
and company, just to mention a few Brooks (2008). Each entity has its own individual 
characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables (for example, in this study 
financial liberalization could impact financial instability). 
 
The fixed effects model was expressed as: 
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Yit = β1Xit + αi + Uit          4.5 
Where: 
           αi (i=1….n) was the unidentified intercept for each entity (n entity-specific intercepts). 
           Yit was the dependent variable where i = entity and t = time. 
          Xit represented one independent variable, 
         β1 was the coefficient for the independent, 
        Uit was the error term. 
 
Prior the use of the fixed effects technique, the researcher has to assume that something within 
the tested entity may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and needs control for 
this. This is the logic behind the assumption of the correlation between the entity’s error term 
and predictor variables. Fixed effects eradicate the effects of those time-invariant 
characteristics so that the clear effect of the predictors on the outcome variable can be assessed 
(Brooks, 2008). 
 
The Fixed effects model also assumes that those time-invariant characteristics are different for 
each entity and should not be correlated with another entity’s characteristics. Each entity is 
unique therefore the entity’s error term and the constant should not be correlated with others. 
If the error terms are correlated, this means that the fixed effect is not suitable for the study 
since implications may not be precise and may have to switch to the Random effect technique. 
This is the main foundation for the Hausman test (Hsiao and Racine, 2006).  
 
4.5.2 Selecting the Correct Technique 
To choose between using fixed or random affects the researcher’ Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is in that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative fixed effects. It 
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basically tests whether the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors, the null 
hypothesis indicates that they are not.  
4.5.2.1 The Hausman Test 
The Hausman Specification Test confirms whether statistical models correspond to the data. 
According to Brooks (2008), under the Hausman test, if there is no correlation between effects 
and regressors, then both the random and fixed effects are consistent, however the fixed effect 
will be ineffective. On the other hand if the correlation exists then the fixed effect will be 
consistent and the random effect will not be consistent. Under the null hypothesis of no 
correlation, there should be no variances between the estimators. 
 
To execute the Hausman test, the researcher calculates the variance of βRandom effects –βFixed effects, 
and also its covariance. The covariance of an efficient estimator with its differences from an 
inefficient estimator has to be zero. Under the null the hypothesis the researcher tests: 
W= (βRandom effects –βFixed effects )∑-1 (βRandom effects –βFixed effects) ~ X2(k) 
If the W equals to be significant, the random effects must not be utilized as the estimator. 
 
4.6 THE RESIDUAL CROSS-SECTION DEPENDENCE TEST 
The study also used the residual cross-section dependence test as a diagnostic test. According 
to Pesaran (2004) this test is a simple test of error cross-section dependence which can apply 
to many panel data models and unit root dynamic heterogeneous panels with a Large N, but 
small T. 
 
Cross sectional dependence deals with the impact of shocks in one country on another country 
when both countries fit in the same panel data set (Pesaran, 2004). For instance, assuming there 
are four Banks, two of the banks are big and other banks have business dealings with them, 
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shocks in these two banks will one way or the other affect the other ones. However, cross-
sectional dependence is not common in micro data like organizations, however it is more 
common in countries. Cross sectional dependency in panel data can be tested by three tests. 
These are the Pesaran CD, Bruesch-Pegan and the corrected LM tests. This study utilized 
Eviews to compute these three tests (Pesaran, 2004). 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter used the literature in the preceding chapter as a foundation to pronounce the 
methodology that would be adopted the study.  The chapter specified the model, defined the 
variables and expectation apriori; discussed the data sources, methods of data analysis and the 
estimation technique. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapter outlines the methodology that was adopted in this study to investigate 
the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability in the selected SADC countries. 
This chapter applied the model developed in Chapter four. This was done by showing several 
diagnostic tests, firstly the Hausman to establish the appropriate model for the study between 
fixed effects and random effects, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
The yearly dataset for the period 1970 to 2012 for South Africa, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania was used. The results from this chapter were used to address the second objective 
set out in Chapter 1 which was to empirically assess the extent to which liberalization of the 
financial system impact financial instability. Section 5.2 chooses the correct model between 
fixed effect models and random effects model while Section 5.3 reports the descriptive 
statistics of all the variables in the model developed. Section 5.4 analyses the correlation 
between the variables and Sections 5.5 discusses the regression with the impact of financial 
liberalization on impaired loans ratio. Section 5.6 discusses the regression with the lagged 
impaired loans ratio and the dependent variable whereas Section 5.7 reports on the Residual 
Cross-Section Dependence Test and Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the statistics of the variables used in the study. The standard 
deviation of the dependent variable is close to unity. The average mean for financial reforms 
is 15.96 over the full period of 1998 to 2012 and this is highly consistent with the study by 
Bumann and Lensink (2016) who recorded a 15.6 mean.  For all variables, the within-variation 
seems to be sufficiently strong to justify fixed effect specification. Table 5.1 also shows that 
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all the variables employed in the model are normally distributed as shown by the p-value of the 
Jarque-Bera test. The average of financial reforms was 15.6 showing the highest maximum 
value of 18.2. The average of impaired loans was 1.55 with a maximum value 3.2 and minimum 
value of -3.50. The average of credit to private was 2.97 with a maximum value of 5.07 and 
minimum value of 1.35. The average of government expenditure was 2.6 with a maximum 
value 3.03 and minimum value of 1.93. The average of inflation was 2.09 with a maximum 
value 3.30 and minimum value of 1.93.  The average of GDP was 5.05 with a maximum value 
12.72 and minimum value of -12.67.   
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 FINANCI
AL_REF
ORMS 
LIMPAIR
ED_LOA
NS 
LDCP LGOVER
NMENT_
EXP 
LINFLAT
ION 
GDP_GR
OWTH 
 Mean  15.96875  1.550658  2.977167  2.678176  2.093951  5.055115 
 Median  15.87500  1.671178  2.441623  2.828702  2.072354  5.318763 
 Maximum  18.25000  3.200712  5.075954  3.037093  3.308326  12.72097 
 Minimum  13.00000 -3.506558  1.351077  1.937408  0.073817 -12.67379 
 Std. Dev.  1.582095  1.113038  1.177555  0.314742  0.491712  3.743697 
 Skewness -0.049706 -1.646057  0.872065 -0.851729 -0.758195 -1.849335 
 Kurtosis  2.075006  9.046817  2.185293  2.344843  7.183792  10.22796 
Jarque-Bera  1.153995  106.6545  9.264334  8.327496  49.50887  164.8089 
Probability  0.561582  0.000000  0.009734  0.015549  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  511.0000  83.73554  178.6300  160.6905  125.6371  303.3069 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
 77.59375  65.65929  81.81150  5.844701  14.26505  826.9006 
 Observatio
ns 
 32  54  60  60  60  60 
Source: Author (Computed with Eviews 8) 
 
5.3 CORRELATION MATRIX (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ILR AND 
ALLVARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY. 
Table 5.2 reports the relationship between impaired loans (measures financial instability), the 
dependent variables with financial reforms and the control variables namely inflation, domestic 
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credit in the private sector, government expenditure and GDP. As shown in Table 5.2, 
correlation between impaired loans, credit to the private sector and government expenditure is 
positive and also significant. To add on, the correlation between impaired loans, inflation and 
GDP is positive and significant. This means that all the variables are significant in explaining 
the financial instability of a country. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant 
at 5% when explaining impaired loans. 
 
Interestingly, impaired loans and GDP were positively correlated. This is in line with the 
findings of Checchetti and Kharroubiz (2012) who found that financial liberalization increases 
the probability of defaults. This further creates higher debt levels thus negatively impacting 
GDP and suggests that financial liberalization increase financial instability.  
There is a negative significant correlation between the variables, credit in the private sector and 
GDP and is supported by the De meza Webb model. This negative correlation could directly 
be due to over-borrowing. Over-borrowing is a problem as this leads to defaults, which have a 
negative impact on GDP. The highest correlation of 75% is constituted by credit to the private 
sector. This indicates that this variable is of high importance when considering the impact of 
financial liberalization on impaired loans. The following sections further tested the variables, 
as the conclusion cannot be solely based on the correlation diagnostic test.  
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Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Source: Author (Computed with Eviews 8) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level of significance 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level of significance  
 
FINANCIAL_RE
FORMS  
LIMPAIRED_L
OANS  
LDCP  LGOVERNMENT
_EXP  
LINFLATION  GDP_GRO
WTH  
FINANCIAL
_REFORMS  
1 
     
LIMPAIRED
_LOANS  
 0.203* 
 
1 
    
P-value (0.309) ----- 
    
LDCP   0.750*   0.055** 1 
   
P-value (0.000) (0.781) ----- 
   
LGOVERN
MENT_EXP  
     0.365*  0.023** 0.527* 1 
  
P-value  (0.061) (0.234) (0.004) ----- 
  
LINFLATIO
N  
 -0.018**   0.046** -0.121* -0.162* 1 
 
P-value (0.929) (0.817) (0.544) (0.418) ----- 
 
GDP_GROW
TH  
-0.241*   0.006** -0.231*  0.280* -0.246* 1 
P-value (0.224) (0.972) (0.246) (0.155) (0.215) ----- 
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5.4 CHOOSING THE CORRECT MODEL 
Even though the collected data specifies the applicability of the fixed effects model in this 
study, it was essential to conduct appropriate tests which were the Hausman and F-tests. After 
conducting these tests the author has presented the results in Table 5.3 the results agree that the 
fixed effects models should be used to account for country specific features. 
 
Table 5.3: Hausman test and F-test 
Test Test Statistic Critical 
value 
Conclusion 
Redundant Fixed Effects Test 
H0: Cross-sections are 
homogenous 
H1: Cross-sections are 
heterogeneous 
 
F=5.226  P-value= 
0.000897 
We reject H0 and conclude 
that the Fixed effects model 
should be used to account for 
country specific features.  
Random effects vs Fixed 
effects 
H0: µ1 = µ2 = … = µN-1 = 0 
HA: Not all equal to 0. 
Chi-
Square=33.337  
P-
value=0.00 
We reject H0. This means the 
fixed effects model is the 
best model that allows 
heterogeneity. 
Source: Author (Hausman test and F- test computed with Eviews 8) 
 
The probability-value for the test is less than 1% level of significance, indicating that the 
random effect panel data technique is not suitable for this study and a fixed effect is rather 
chosen. 
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5.5 REGRESSIONS WITH THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ON 
ILR 
Table 5.4 below includes the estimation results for the model formulated in Chapter Four. Table 
5.4 shows the results of regressions with the impact of financial liberalization on impaired loans 
ratio.  In Table 5.4, the empirical results indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
financial instability and financial liberalization. A 1% increase in financial liberalization 
contributed 0.0745 percent increase in financial instability, although financial reform was 
insignificant. These results are in line with the apriori expectation which was that financial 
reform will result in financial instability. These results are also in line with the study of 
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2006) who established that financial liberalization lessens screening 
efforts, leaving entrepreneurs’ risk projects which are highly exposed to shocks. Dell’Arricia 
and Marquez (2006) also highlighted that, though high and unstable, inflation often increases 
the demand for financial reforms. This in turn causes additional increases in inflation, 
particularly if fiscal deficits are enormous and the exchange depreciates drastically thus 
resulting in financial instability. 
 
In Equation two, the financial reform dummy variable and domestic credit to private sector 
were introduced. The introduced dummy variables captured the global. Financial reform 
without the dummy was positive and significant. When the financial reform dummy which 
captured the global was introduced, the relationship between financial instability and financial 
liberalization was positive. This suggests that a 1% increase in financial reforms resulted in 
0.238 percent increase in financial instability. This outcome follows the studies of Dell’Arricia 
and Marquez (2006), Lorenzoni (2008), Magud; et al. (2012), Calderón and Kubota (2012), 
Bezemer, Bumann and Lensink (2015), which also showed that during of the global financial 
crisis, financial liberalization intensified competition which then resulted in a decline in the 
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franchise value of banks. The only way banks responded to this was by accepting more risk 
exposure so as to maintain their profits, resulting in an increased financial instability and more 
often the rise in bank failures during the deregulation of the financial sector.  
On the other hand, the results show that private credit which is the measure of financial 
development is negatively related to financial crisis. However, significant at 1% in other words 
improvements in the financial sector do not lead to financial instability. The estimations show 
that an increase in credit in the private sector by 1% leads to a decline in financial instability 
by 0.740 percent. The studies of Abiad et al. (2010), Balmaceda, Fischer and Ramirez (2013) 
and Bezemer (2015) support these results and concluded that private credit increase represents 
financial openness which creates competitiveness, slowing down financial instability. On the 
other hand, Bezemer, et al. (2015) argues that, though credit is good for the economy, a huge 
credit growth can harm macroeconomic stability in many ways. Assuming that providing credit 
influences consumption, growth in private sector credit can over- fuel the total demand even 
over the framework of potential output and cause the economy to singe and also finishing 
resources. The effects spiral to inflation, the current account deficit, interest rates and the real 
exchange rate.  
 
Equation three results maintain the consistent results for the above discussed variables, 
government expenditure results and inflation. Government expenditure and inflation 
coefficients show that these two control variables have a negative relationship with financial 
instability. Government expenditure is statically significant at 5% level of significance whilst 
inflation is insignificant. The negative relationship for both these variables suggests that an 
increase in each of these variables will lead to a decrease in financial instability. Results 
showing the relationship between inflation and financial instability were expected. According 
to Ikhide (2015) and Odhiambo (2011), inflation negatively affects the holding of all groups of 
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financial assets and inflation tends to encourage the holding of currency and discourage the 
holding of quasi-money. A higher inflation rate inspires households to trade purchased 
transactions services for money balances, thus enhancing the financial sector which further 
declines financial instability.  
 
The results of the relationship between government expenditure and financial instability were 
expected and are in line with the study of Bezemer et al. (2015). An increase in government 
expenditure on socio-economic and physical infrastructure encourages economic growth and 
hence reduces financial instability.  
 
The GDP coefficient had a positive effect and an increase in the economic growth led to an 
increase of the financial instability by 0.004 points. Although positive, this coefficient is 
econometrically incorrect. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained by Guillaumont 
and Kpodar (2006) and were not expected. A negative relationship was expected between the 
variable GDP and financial instability, as stated by the McKinnon and Shaw model. Liberalized 
interest rates lead to increased investment, which ultimately leads to economic growth thus 
reducing financial instability. Basu (2002) classified this assumption as unrealistic as it is 
possible to argue that perfect competition is forever impractical and impossible in all markets 
and countries, more especially in credit markets. 
 
It is essential to note that financial reform index including the FINANCIAL_REFORMS (-
4)*DT capturing the dummy which capture both global and Asian financial crisis in all the 
three equations has a positive relationship with impaired loans. This implies that banks in more 
financially liberalized selected SADC region countries prove to be financially unstable when 
there is a financial crisis. This is consistent with Bezemer (2015). In addition, the findings of 
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Rancière, Tornell and Westerman (2006), are in line with these results as the authors suggest 
that liberalized economies experience more crisis and are open to more severe output 
contractions during financial crisis. This is because the greater the debt levels in relation to 
gross domestic product (GDP), the greater the probability of failure. 
Table 5.4: Regressions with the Impact of Financial Liberalization on ILR 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variables FE FE FE 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4) 
0.0745 
 (0.54) 
0.638 
 (0.0006) 
0.616 
(0.001) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-4)*DT 
  
0.238 
(0.2291) 
0.262 
(0.195) 
LDCP   
-0.870* 
(0.001) 
-0.740* 
(0.001) 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP     
-0.915 
(0.035) 
LINFLATION     
-0.036** 
(0.889) 
GDP_GROWTH   
  
0.004 
(0.896) 
CONSTANT 
0.463 
(0.811) 
-6.994 
(0.0016) 
-4.601 
(0.037) 
        
Years effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 1.65 1.65 1.65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.862 0.862 0.86 
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Source: Author (Computed with Eviews 8) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level of significance, 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level of significance  
It is essential to note that the adjusted R-squared across all the specifications is at 86% this 
means that the variations in the dependent variable are properly explained by the independent 
variables and it can be concluded that the model is a good fit. 
 
5.6 REGRESSIONS WITH LAGGED DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
In table 5.5 the dependant variable ILR is lagged. When the dependant variable has been 
lagged, the coefficients of ILR are significantly positive in all the three equations. This implies 
that there is partiality amongst the coefficients. The coefficient of ILR also increases. 
According to Bezemer, et al. (2015), a higher impaired loans’ ratio means more financial 
instability. When the dependant variable is lagged, the complete equations are as follows: 
Equation one shows a negative relationship between financial reform index and financial 
instability and this relationship is also statistically insignificant. In Equation two and three the 
relationship changes to positive, but continues to be statically insignificant. Delis (2012) also 
used the financial reform variable and found that financial liberalization policies decrease the 
banks’ market power leading to financial instability, especially in developed economies. On 
the other hand, financial reform index with a dummy variable has a positive relationship with 
financial instability and this relationship remains the same in all three equations. This is 
consistent with the study of Bezemer, et al. (2015). These results suggest that an increase in 
the financial liberalization index in 2005 is linked with a rise in the ILR in 2009.  
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Domestic credit to private is added into Equations two and three. In both the specifications, 
domestic credit to the public has a negative relationship with financial instability. The 
estimations show that an increase of credit in the private sector contributes to the decline of the 
financial instability. These results are expected as according to Abaid, et al. (2008) who 
observed that more efficient credit allocation contributes to financial stability.  
 
It is interesting to note that the GDP coefficient becomes negative after lagging the dependant 
variable, an increase in economic growth leads to a decline in the financial instability by 0.19 
points. These results support the theory of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) which was also 
expected.  
 
Government expenditure and inflation are both added in Equation three. Both these control 
variables show a negative relationship with financial instability. An increase in both variables 
leads to a decline in financial instability. These results are consistent with those of the study by 
Bezemer, et al. (2015). 
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Table 5.5: Regression with Lagged Dependant Variable (ILR) 
  Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Variables FE FE FE  
IMPAIRED_LOANS(1) 
0.836 
(0.0003) 
0.696 
(0.01) 
0.424 
(0.211) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-
4) 
-0.056 
 (0.943) 
1.122 
(0.453) 
2.000 
(0.198) 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS(-
4)*DT 
0.113  
(0.941) 
0.044 
(0.977) 
1.226  
 (0.467) 
LDCP 
 
  
-1.572 
(0.351) 
-2.888 
(0.132) 
GDP_GROWTH 
  
-0.199 
(0.498) 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP     
-4.859 
(0.187) 
LINFLATION     
-2.823 
(0.212) 
CONSTANT 
2.046 
(0.849) 
-10.975 
(0.533) 
-4.623 
(0.793) 
        
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30 30 30 
R-Square 0.67 0.69 0.75 
Source: Author (Computed with Eviews 8) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level of significance, 
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level of significance 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level of significance   
 
5.7 RESIDUAL CROSS-SECTION DEPENDANCE TEST 
Table 5.6: Residual Cross-Section Dependence Test 
Test Test Statistic Critical 
value 
Conclusion 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
H0: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
H1: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
16.179 P-value= 
0.0100897 
We accept H0 and conclude 
that the model has no cross-
section dependence in 
residuals. 
Pesaran scaled LM 
H0: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
H1: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
1.784  P-
value=0.00 
We accept H0 and conclude 
that the model has no cross-
section dependence in 
residuals. 
Pesaran CD Test 
H0: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
H1: No cross-section dependence 
in residuals. 
-0.0068 P-
value=0.99 
We reject H0 and conclude 
that the model has no cross-
section dependence in 
residuals. 
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The Residual Cross-Section Dependence Tests were run. In table 5.6 both LM test results 
showed a probability of 0.0128 and 0.0745, respectively. This indicates that, there is no 
correlation between the residual values in the model, and the null hypothesis is therefore 
accepted. It is essential to note that the LM statistics can be accentuated, contributing in size 
misrepresentations which tend to worsen with the Nth term. The results of the Pesaran CD test 
which addresses the LM test shortcomings show a probability of 0.99. This indicates that, there 
is correlation between the residual values in the model and allows the author to reject null 
hypothesis. According to Pesaran (2004), it is proven that these tests are correctly centred for 
fixed N and T, and have robustness to one or more structural breaks in the slope coefficients 
and error variances.  
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Firstly, the descriptive statistics showed that all the variables were significant in explaining the 
financial instability of the selected countries. The Correlation analysis results of the different 
variables confirm partially the assumptions of the theories discussed in Chapter three. In this 
chapter the Hausmann test was run and the outcomes suggested that the study should adopt the 
fixed effect method. The results show that financial liberalization leads to financial instability. 
The financial reforms are positively related with the impaired loans ratio in almost all the 
specifications. The financial instability further intensifies when the global financial crisis is 
taken into consideration. 
 
Interestingly, when the dependent variable is lagged, all the results of the relationship between 
impaired loans and control variables namely credit to the private sector, government 
expenditure, GDP and inflation suggest that financial liberalization leads to financial stability. 
However, the relationship between impaired and the above-mentioned control variables was 
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insignificant. It is worth mentioning that a rapid growth in variables such as inflation and credit 
could greatly harm the economy and existing empirical studies do attest to this. This is because 
the greater the debt levels in relation to gross domestic product, the greater the probability of 
failure of the economy.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a conclusion of the dissertation and also the policy recommendations 
based on the study. The chapter further discusses the limitations of the study. It is structured as 
follows: Section 6.2 summarises of all the chapters, Section 6.3 discusses the policy 
implications and recommendations, Section 6.4 highlights the limitations of the study and 
Section 6.5 provides suggestions for further studies. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS  
Chapter two provided an overview of financial liberalisation for each selected SADC countries 
namely South Africa, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania. It has been observed that the 
SADC member states’ financial markets are too small, with the exception of South Africa. This 
could be due to low levels of financial transmission and high interest margins in many SADC 
countries. In total, post financial liberalization, the SADC region has maintained a strong 
economic growth and future prospects are promising. Most SADC member states have steadily 
implemented banking liberalization. 
 
Chapter three covered the theoretical and empirical literature and its assessment. Both 
theoretical and empirical literature showed that there is no consensus regarding the impact of 
financial liberalization on financial instability in a country. The McKinnon and Show model 
views suggest that with financial liberalization, interest rates will rise, increasing savings and 
investment. On the other hand, De Meza and Webb (1987) model suggest that the impact of 
financial liberalization on financial instability is an empirical matter. The empirical literature 
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has discussed the different views that authors have pointed out when looking at financial 
liberalization and financial instability. 
 
Chapter four focused on literature as a foundation to pronounce the methodology that was 
adopted in the study.  The chapter specified the model, defined the variables and expectation 
apriori the data sources, methods of data analysis and the estimation techniques were also 
discussed. 
 
Chapter five served to fulfil the main objective of the study. This chapter applied the model 
developed in Chapter four to empirically assess the extent to which liberalization of the 
financial system impacted financial instability. Findings indicated that, financial liberalization 
may be another source of financial instability. This is because financial reforms which were 
found to be positively related to the impaired loans ratio in almost all the specifications. The 
financial instability further intensifies when the global financial crisis is taken into 
consideration. However, when financial reforms were lagged, the results were found to be 
negative.  
The results also established that there is a negative relationship between financial sector 
development and instability. This suggests that financial sector development plays a very 
important role of reducing financial instability overtime, and not just instantly. 
 
The relationship between impaired loans and control variables namely credit to the private 
sector, government expenditure, GDP and inflation suggest that financial liberalization leads 
to financial stability. However, the relationship between impaired and the above-mentioned 
control variables is insignificant and the GDP’s coefficient is econometrically incorrect. It is 
therefore impractical for this study to follow these results. Growth in variables such as inflation 
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and credit could greatly harm the economy and existing empirical findings as supported by De 
Meza and Webb (1987).   
 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The empirical results have shown that there is a positive relationship between financial sector 
liberalization and financial instability. This suggests that policy makers should focus on 
reforms that give due share to the regulations rather than just simply liberalizing the financial 
sector. The empirical results have also shown a negative relationship between the financial 
sector liberalization and financial instability when the dependent variable is lagged. Therefore, 
policies which are aimed at developing the financial sector should be pursued. 
It also recommended that further studies should not focus on financial liberalization broadly, 
but instead narrow it to a more microeconomic level. For instance, they could focus on supply 
and demand by firms and households as well as lending and borrowings by household and not 
just focus on financial institutions. 
 
6.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The study observed the impact of financial liberalization on financial instability in selected 
SADC countries for the period 1970 to 2012. The choice of both the countries and the period 
of 1970 to 2012 is driven by the availability of data. The data on the actual dates of deregulation 
of some policy variables was not readily available.  
 
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
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It is suggested that in further research around the topic could investigate into the transmission 
channels of financial liberalization namely admission of risky borrowers and decreasing cost 
of borrowing which was concisely looked in the theoretical literature chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
REFERENCE LIST 
 
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E. & Tressel, T. (2010). “A New Database of Financial Reforms.”  
IMF Staff Papers 57 (2): 281-301. 
 
Agnello, L., Mallick, S.K., & Sousa, R.M. (2012). Financial reforms and income inequality. 
Economics Letters 116, 583–587.  
 
Baldacci, F., De Mello, I. & Inchauste. (2012) “Financial crisis, Poverty and Income 
Distribution.” Working paper 02/04, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
 
Balmaceda, F., Fischer, R., & Ramirez, F. (2013). Financial liberalization, market structure    
and credit penetration. Journal of Financial Intermediation, forthcoming.   
Banco Nacional de Angola. (2013). Integrated Paper on Recent Economic Development in 
SADC. Prepared for the committee of Central Bank Governors in SADC by Banco Nacional 
de Angola, September. 
Barrell, R., Davis E.P., Karim, D., & Liadze, I. (2010). Bank regulation, property prices and 
early warning systems for banking crises in OECD countries, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
34, 2455-64. 
 
Basu, S. (2002). Financial Liberalization and Intervention: A New Analysis of Credit 
Rationing, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
Bordo, M., Barry, E., Daniela, K., Maria, S., Martinez, P., & Andrew, R. (2001). Is the Crisis 
Problem Growing More Severe? Economic Policy 16(32): 51 – 82. 
 
Brooks, C. (2008). Introduction to Econometrics. Cambridge Press. 
 
Bezemer, D., Bumann, S., & Lensink, R. (2015). Financial Liberalization and Financial 
Instability. Faculty of Economics and Business: University of Groningen.  
 
Bumann, S., & Lensink, R. (2016). Capital account liberalization and income inequality. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 61, 143-162. 
88 
 
 
Calderón, C., & Kubota, M. (2012). Gross inflows gone wild: gross capital inflows, credit 
booms and crises, Policy Research Working Paper no. 6270, The World Bank.  
 
Checchetti, S., Kharroubi, E. (2012). Reassessing the impact of finance on growth, BIS 
Working Papers no. 381, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Christopoulos, D., & McAdam, P. (2015). Do financial reforms help stabilize inequality? ECB 
Working Paper 1780, European Central Bank, Frankfurt.  
 
Čihák, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Feyen, E., & Ross Levine, R. (2012) "Benchmarking Financial 
Systems around the World.” Policy Research Working Paper, WPS6175, World Bank.  
 
Das, M., & Mohapatra, S. (2003). Income inequality: the aftermath of stock market 
liberalization in emerging markets. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10, 217–48. 
  
De Meza, D., & Webb, D.C. (1987). Too much investment: A problem of asymmetric 
information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 102, no. 2, pp. 281-292. 
 
Delis, D. (2012). Bank Competition, Financial Reform, and Institutions: The Importance of 
Being Developed. Journal of Development Economics 97(2), pp. 450–465. 
 
Dell’Ariccia, G., & Marquez, R. (2006). Lending booms and lending standards, Journal of 
Finance, vol. 61, no.5, pp. 2511-2546. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2008). Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long Run 
Growth. M. Spence Growth Commission Background Paper, No 11, World Bank, Washington, 
DC.  
Eichengreen, B., & Arteta, C. (2000). Banking crises in emerging markets: presumptions and 
evidence. Centre for International and Development Economics, WP C00-115.  
Enowbi B, M., & Mlambo, K. (2012). Financial liberalisation, Banking Crises and Economic 
Growth in African Countries, MPRA Paper 41524, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
89 
 
Furceri, D., Guichard, S., & Rusticelli, E. (2012). The effect of episodes of large capital inflows 
on domestic credit, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 
325–344.  
Furceri, D., & Loungani, P. (2015). Capital account liberalization and inequality. IMF 
Working Paper 15/243. 
Gidlow, R. M. (1995). Monetary Policies under Dr T. W. De Jongh: 1967 – 1980, Pretoria: 
South African Reserve Bank. 
Guillaumont, S. & Kpodar, R. (2004). Financial Development, Financial instability and 
Poverty, Working Paper No. 2004-13, CERDI.  
Hsiao, C. & Racine. J. (2006). A Consistent Model Specification Test of Mixed Categorical and 
Continuous Data Journal of Econometrics, 140 (2007) 802–826 
 
Ikhide, S.I. (2015). The Finance and Growth Debate in Africa: What Role for Financial 
Inclusion. Sun Media, ISBN 978-0-7972-1599.  
Ikhide, S.I. (1992). Financial deepening, credit availability and the efficiency of investment: 
Evidence of selected African countries. Development research paper series, research paper: 2.  
 
Ikhide, S.I. & Alawode, A. (2002). On the sequencing of financial liberalization in Nigeria. 
South African Journal of Economics, 70(1):95–127, 03.  
 
International Monetary Fund. (2009). Republic of Mozambique: Financial Sector Assessment 
Program - Financial System Stability Assessment. IMF Country Report No. 10/12. 
International Monetary Fund. (2011). World Economic Outlook 2011. International Monetary 
Fund. 
International Monetary Fund. (2015). Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth 
in Emerging Markets, IMF, Washington, DC. 
Kaminsky, G.L, & Schmukler, S.L. (2003). Short-run pain, long-run gain: The effects of 
financial liberalization, IMF Working Paper no. 03/34, International Monetary Fund.  
90 
 
Khumalo, S., & Kapingura, F. (2013). Impact of capital account liberalization on economic 
growth in Africa: A case study of South Africa, Proceedings from the m VIII. International 
Conference on Applied Business Research ICABR, Mendel University in Brno, Zemedelska. 
Krugman, P. (1979). “A Model of Balance of Payements Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 11, 311-25. 
Lorenzoni, G. (2008). Inefficient credit booms, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 
809-833. 
Loayza R. & Ranciere, R. (2002). Financial Development, Financial Instability and Growth, 
CESifo Working Paper No. 684.  
Manzombi, P. (2015) Estimating trade flows: case of South Africa and BRICs, University of 
South Africa, Pretoria, http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18532. 
Magud, N. E., Reinhart, C. M., & Vesperoni, E. R. (2012). Capital inflows, exchange rate 
flexibility, and credit booms. IMF Working Paper no. 41, International Monetary Fund.  
McKinnon, R.I. (1973). Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution.  
Moyo, J., Nandwa, B., Oduor, J. & Simpasa, A. (2014). Financial sector reforms, competition 
and banking system stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Moza Banco SA. (2012). About us. Retrieved 2012, from www.mozabanco.co.mz: 
http://www.mozabanco.co.mz/Institucional/Quem-Somos. 
Mpofu, T. R. (2013). Real exchange rate volatility and employment growth in South Africa: 
The case of manufacturing. 
Murinde, V. (2010). “Bank regulation in Africa: From Basel I to Basel II, and now at a 
crossroads”, in: Bradford, C., Lim, W. (Eds.), Towards Consolidation of the G20, Chapter 9, 
141-168, Seoul and Washington DC: Korea Development Institute and Brookings. 
Nier, E., (2005). Bank stability and transparency, Journal of Financial Stability 1, 342-354.  
Obstfeld, M. (1996): “Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features,” European 
Economic Review, 40(3-5), 1037–47. 
91 
 
Odhiambo, N. M. (2011). The Impact of Financial Liberalisation in Developing Countries: 
Experiences from Four SADC Countries, (OSSREA), Addis Ababa. [Online] Available: 
http://www.ossrea.net/publications/images/stories/ossrea/impact-financial-liberalisation-dev-
countries.pdf. [Accessed: 04 September 2012]. 
Odhiambo, N. M. (2005). Financial liberalisation and financial deepening: Evidence from 
three SSA countries. African Review of Money Finance and Banking (Savings and 
Development Supplement): 5-23. 
 
Patnaik, P. (2011), The Meaning of Financial Liberalisation. Monthly Review Press 4 June 
2011. Online. Available: http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/patnaik040611.html. 
[Accessed: 26 September 2012] 
 
Pesaran, M. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels, 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, No. 435, University of Cambridge, and CESifo 
Working Paper Series No. 1229. 
Rancière, R., Tornell, A., & Westermann, F. (2006). Decomposing the effects of financial 
liberalization: Crises vs. growth, Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 30, no. 12, and pp. 3331-
3348.  
Rodrik, D. (2005). Growth Strategies, Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & 
Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 
967-1014 Elsevier. 
Shaw, E.S. (1973). Financial deepening in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, 
New York.  
Sibanda, H.S. (2012). Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth in South Africa. 
University of Fort Hare.  
Taylor, L. (1983). Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable models for the Third World. New 
York: Basic Books.  
Tornell, A, & Westermann, F. (2003). “Credit Market Imperfections in Middle Income 
Countries, NBER WP 9737.  
92 
 
Tyavambiza, T. & Nyangara, D. (2015). ‘Financial and Monetary Reforms and the Finance 
Growth Relationship in Zimbabwe’, International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 
5(2): 590-602 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2010). Towards SADC services 
liberalisation: Balancing multiple imperatives. Geneva: UNCTAD.  
Van Wijnbergen, S. (1983). Interest rate management in LDCs. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol.12: 443-52. 
Williamson, J., & M. Mohar. (1998). A survey of financial liberalisation. Essays in 
International Finance, Princeton University, No. 211 (November). 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
APPENDIX 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
GDP_GRO
WTH LDCP 
LGOVERN
MENT_EXP 
LIMPAIRED
_LOANS 
LINFLATIO
N 
 Mean  5.165029  3.030417  2.713059  1.550658  2.088416 
 Median  5.474471  2.452823  2.839259  1.671178  2.092503 
 Maximum  12.72097  5.075954  3.037093  3.200712  3.275697 
 Minimum -12.67379  1.407991  1.937408 -3.506558  0.073817 
 Std. Dev.  3.918061  1.177871  0.296936  1.113038  0.485548 
 Skewness -1.876013  0.840111 -1.118826 -1.646057 -1.124041 
 Kurtosis  9.712497  2.085337  3.045384  9.046817  7.609436 
      
 Jarque-Bera  133.0545  8.234442  11.27059  106.6545  59.17673 
 Probability  0.000000  0.016290  0.003570  0.000000  0.000000 
      
 Sum  278.9116  163.6425  146.5052  83.73554  112.7744 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  813.6138  73.53114  4.673075  65.65929  12.49509 
      
 Observations  54  54  54  54  54 
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Correlation Matrix 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary     
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 20:56     
Sample: 1998 2012      
Included observations: 54     
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)    
       
       Correlation      
Probability 
GDP_GROW
TH  LDCP  
LGOVERNM
ENT_EXP  
LIMPAIRED
_LOANS  
LINFLATIO
N   
GDP_GROWTH  1.000000      
 -----       
       
LDCP  -0.261222 1.000000     
 0.0564 -----      
       
LGOVERNMENT
_EXP  0.260588 0.553416 1.000000    
 0.0570 0.0000 -----     
       
LIMPAIRED_LOA
NS  -0.118610 -0.050729 0.005291 1.000000   
 0.3930 0.7156 0.9697 -----    
       
LINFLATION  -0.164719 -0.198301 -0.260736 0.197629 1.000000  
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 0.2339 0.1506 0.0569 0.1520 -----   
       
        
Hausman Test 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 33.337112 5 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     FINANCIAL_REFOR
MS(-4) 0.651394 0.067084 0.013856 0.0000 
GDP_GROWTH 0.003827 -0.054260 0.000384 0.0030 
LDCP -0.718313 -0.259026 0.012777 0.0000 
LGOVERNMENT_E
XP -0.863716 -0.699000 0.010686 0.1111 
LINFLATION 0.102641 0.169871 0.024889 0.6700 
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Regressions with the Impact of Financial Liberalization on ILR 
Equation 1 
Dependent Variable: IMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:25   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 31  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     FINANCIAL_REFOR
MS(-4) 0.074544 0.119774 0.622373 0.5401 
C 0.463208 1.913595 0.242062 0.8110 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.313112    Mean dependent var 1.650498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063335    S.D. dependent var 0.864592 
S.E. of regression 0.836765    Akaike info criterion 2.719153 
Sum squared resid 15.40386    Schwarz criterion 3.135472 
Log likelihood -33.14687    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.854862 
F-statistic 1.253565    Durbin-Watson stat 0.380935 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.316289    
     
      
Equation 2 
Dependent Variable: IMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:22   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 31  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4) 0.638276 0.157023 4.064859 0.0006 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4)*DT 0.238768 0.192478 1.240492 0.2291 
LDCP -0.870430 0.172092 -5.057930 0.0001 
C -6.994343 1.920520 -3.641900 0.0016 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.720930    Mean dependent var 1.650498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.581395    S.D. dependent var 0.864592 
S.E. of regression 0.559389    Akaike info criterion 1.947478 
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Sum squared resid 6.258311    Schwarz criterion 2.456312 
Log likelihood -19.18590    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.113345 
F-statistic 5.166655    Durbin-Watson stat 1.182317 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000895    
     
      
Equation 3 
Dependent Variable: IMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:18   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 31  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4) 0.616283 0.157286 3.918236 0.0011 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4)*DT 0.262499 0.194912 1.346755 0.1957 
GDP_GROWTH 0.004186 0.031683 0.132109 0.8964 
LDCP -0.740885 0.192715 -3.844462 0.0013 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP -0.915855 0.400990 -2.283984 0.0355 
LINFLATION -0.036952 0.260919 -0.141623 0.8890 
C -4.601181 2.040525 -2.254900 0.0376 
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 Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.798502    Mean dependent var 1.650498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.644416    S.D. dependent var 0.864592 
S.E. of regression 0.515564    Akaike info criterion 1.815340 
Sum squared resid 4.518702    Schwarz criterion 2.462948 
Log likelihood -14.13778    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.026444 
F-statistic 5.182170    Durbin-Watson stat 1.655547 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001045    
     
      Regression with Lagged Dependant Variable (ILR)  
Equation 1 
Dependent Variable: LIMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:40   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 30  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     IMPAIRED_LOANS(1) 0.836709 0.191644 4.365963 0.0003 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4) -0.056572 0.787738 -0.071816 0.9435 
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FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4)*DT 0.113127 1.508591 0.074989 0.9410 
C 2.046587 10.65757 0.192031 0.8498 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.676495    Mean dependent var 6.954092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.506230    S.D. dependent var 6.027188 
S.E. of regression 4.235232    Akaike info criterion 6.001328 
Sum squared resid 340.8066    Schwarz criterion 6.515101 
Log likelihood -79.01992    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.165688 
F-statistic 3.973177    Durbin-Watson stat 2.194135 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004736    
     
      
 
Equation 2 
Dependent Variable: LIMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 30  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
101 
 
     
     IMPAIRED_LOANS(1) 0.6866 0.241712 2.880604 0.0100 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4) 1.1223 1.463120 0.767053 0.4530 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4)*DT 0.0441 1.513657 0.029211 0.9770 
LDCP -1.5721 1.643453 -0.956994 0.3512 
C -1.9750 17.29886 -0.634470 0.5338 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.692158    Mean dependent var 6.954092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.504033    S.D. dependent var 6.027188 
S.E. of regression 4.244644    Akaike info criterion 6.018367 
Sum squared resid 324.3060    Schwarz criterion 6.578846 
Log likelihood -78.27551    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.197669 
F-statistic 3.679237    Durbin-Watson stat 2.091655 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007097    
     
      
Equation 3 
 
Dependent Variable: LIMPAIRED_LOANS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 07/12/17   Time: 21:37   
Sample (adjusted): 2002 2009   
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Periods included: 8   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 30  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     IMPAIRED_LOANS(1) 0.424254 0.324804 1.306184 0.2112 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4) 2.000505 1.488181 1.344262 0.1988 
FINANCIAL_REFORMS
(-4)*DT 1.226434 1.646574 0.744840 0.4679 
GDP_GROWTH -0.199802 0.288166 -0.693358 0.4987 
LDCP -2.888404 1.813853 -1.592413 0.1321 
LGOVERNMENT_EXP -4.859535 3.521293 -1.380043 0.1878 
LINFLATION -2.823492 2.170522 -1.300835 0.2129 
C -4.623468 17.37799 -0.266053 0.7938 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.757892    Mean dependent var 6.954092 
Adjusted R-squared 0.531925    S.D. dependent var 6.027188 
S.E. of regression 4.123562    Akaike info criterion 5.978165 
Sum squared resid 255.0565    Schwarz criterion 6.678763 
Log likelihood -74.67247    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.202292 
F-statistic 3.353990    Durbin-Watson stat 2.150420 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013180    
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